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I. Introduction 
As detectives entered the home of O.J. Simpson and as police 
officers repeatedly struck Rodney King, 1 the nation questioned 
whether these actions violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects 
an individual's right to personal security? In both cases, officers as-
serted that their actions were reasonably based on their objective as-
sessment of danger: providing aid to possible victims in Mr. Simpson's 
home and protecting themselves from a disobedient suspect. Resolu-
tion of these Fourth Amendment issues centered on how to assess 
danger to police officers and the community, with little consideration 
given to the right to personal security and privacy. 
When police officers attempt to control suspects during arrests, 
they must exercise only reasonable force, because the Fourth Amend-
ment provides that individuals have a right "to be secure in their per-
sons ... against unreasonable ... seizures."3 Officers must also act 
reasonably when they render aid to victims4 or frisk suspects.5 In 
evaluating the use of force, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated that reasonableness is an objective standard. In Tennessee v. 
Garner,6 the Court addressed the issue of deadly force. The Court 
held that "if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is 
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly 
force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasi-
ble, some warning has been given. "7 In applying this standard to the 
use of nondeadly force, the Court in Graham v. ConnorB articulated 
three factors that determine whether force was reasonable: (1) "the 
severity of the crime;" (2) "whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others;" and (3) "whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."9 
1. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAw: PoLICE AND THE Ex-
CESSIVE UsE OF FoRCE 16 (1993) ("Mistrust and hostility predictably follow upon abuse 
and repression."). 
2. The Fourth Amendment provides in part that "[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 
U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
3. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161, 425-462. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 81-148, 367-405. 
6. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 
27-69. 
7. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. 
8. 490 u.s. 386 (1989). 
9. !d. at 396. 
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Although these decisions provide some guidelines for determining 
reasonable force, many courts have drastically limited the Fourth 
Amendment right to personal security by determining that the pres-
ence of danger automatically justifies both aggressive and preventive 
actions. 
As a result of this interpretation of the Reasonableness Clause, 
courts have misperceived how to assess reasonableness. Too often the 
presence of any danger results in the court's failure to perceive other 
significant issues for resolving whether the conduct was reasonable: 
whether police officers created the need to use force; whether police 
officers should have used less intrusive means to apprehend a suspect; 
whether the Fourth Amendment, under some circumstances, man-
dates that police officers let suspects flee rather than use ever-increas-
ing amounts of nonlethal force; whether juries are necessary to 
determine the reasonableness of a police practice; and whether police 
officers' actions before a seizure are relevant to the reasonableness 
inquiry. The courts should consider the presence of danger when they 
determine reasonableness; however,· courts often erroneously assess 
the degree of danger by strongly deferring to the judgment of police 
officers. These serious misperceptions significantly diminish the 
Fourth Amendment right to personal security. 
Because the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is an 
abstract standard, some guidelines are necessary to aid courts in dis-
cerning the balancing process of the Fourth Amendment. Without 
guidelines, the reasonableness standard may become more rule-like, 10 
with courts continuing to create legal fictions11 and automatic pre-
sumptions of constitutionality.12 These guidelines must take into ac-
count the history of the Fourth Amendment, particularly the fear of 
an unchecked constabulary. As Professor Tracey Maclin has stated: 
"The constitutional lodestar for understanding the Fourth Amend-
ment is not an ad hoc reasonableness standard; rather, the central 
10. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REv. 22, 56-69 (1992). Professor Kathleen Sullivan has stated that a rule "binds 
a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts .... A rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy incompletely and 
so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness." !d. at 58. A standard, however, "al-
Iow[s] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of circum-
stances." !d. at 59. It thus has fewer problems with over- or under-inclusiveness. !d. at 58. 
See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 946 (1987) (balancing includes both weighing competing interests and dis-
cerning the presence of "'compelling' or 'important' state interests"). 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 463-475. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260. 
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and 
discretion.'m However, when assessing the danger posed by suspects, 
courts have strongly deferred to the judgment of police officers and 
have not seriously questioned the need for force.14 Were courts to 
consider the historical distrust of police power when reviewing reason-
able force claims, one would expect less deference to police judgment 
and more concern for an individual's interest in personal security. 
When courts evaluate whether the police used reasonable force, they 
should consider whether alternatives were available to the police of-
ficers, instead of rubber-stamping their actions. By closely scrutiniz-
ing the judgment of police officers, courts would limit the types of 
conduct that establish a reasonable belief that a suspect poses a dan-
ger to police officers and the community. A likely by-product of such 
an approach would be improved municipal training of police officers 
in using devices to restrain subjects.15 
Rather than articulate an evolving standard of reasonableness, 
many courts erroneously use danger as a proxy for reasonableness and 
have defined danger too broadly.16 The lack of scrutiny is clear when 
13. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 197, 201 (1993). See also Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 1993). In 
Kopf, the Fourth Circuit declared that history of the Fourth Amendment supports a rob-
ber's right not to be subject to unreasonable force during his arrest: 
[The robber] was a criminal. He deserved to be arrested and punished; his story 
stirs little sympathy, much Jess outrage, in the crowd. The courts cannot be so 
impassive. We must always remember that unreasonable searches and seizures 
helped drive our forefathers to revolution. One who would defend the Fourth 
Amendment must share his foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but to abandon 
the post because of the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply. 
!d. at 379-80. The Fourth Circuit added, '"[W]hile we are concerned here with a shabby 
defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes of 
the Fourth Amendment."' ld. at 380 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,69 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
14. See Maclin, supra note 13, at 200 ("If the Court can identify any plausible goal or 
reason that promotes Jaw enforcement interests, the challenged police practice is consid-
ered reasonable and the constitutional inquiry is over."). 
15. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.lO (1989) (a municipality 
can be liable for its failure to train officers as to the constitutional limits on the use of 
deadly force). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (used statistics re-
garding the likelihood of gun possession by New York City residents to justify a frisk of an 
individual); United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 1994) (upheld frisk of 
disorderly youths because they had baggy clothing and may have been "emboldened" by 
the presence of a gun); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,780 (4th Cir. 1993) (did not consider 
whether officer created need for force); Kruegher v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1993) (did 
not allow jury to determine whether suspect made a dangerous furtive gesture); United 
States v. Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (upheld frisk because suspect 
allegedly had hand in his pocket, had been drinking, and had a "cocky attitude"); United 
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courts permit police officers to frisk suspects for weaponsP Courts 
readily uphold frisks as preventive measures.18 However, the degree 
of danger justifying a preventive measure, such as frisking, should not 
necessarily justify an aggressive measure, such as a shooting, because 
of the weighty interest in bodily integrity. Under the doctrine of fur-
tive gestures, many courts have held that the same degree of danger 
justified both a frisk and a shooting.19 In short, many courts, without 
considering other important issues, have erroneously held that officers 
could kill a suspect because the suspect moved after an order to 
freeze.20 
This Article asserts that danger is not the only factor to consider 
in determining whether a police practice is unconstitutional. Other 
factors should affect the balancing process of the Fourth Amendment. 
The goal of this Article is to highlight the misperceptions of the 
Fourth Amendment. One common misperception is that the assess-
ment of danger is the same as the assessment of reasonableness. Part 
II reveals that in both Garner and Graham danger was only a factor in 
determining the constitutionality of force during investigations and ar-
rests. Part III shows that when police officers act preventively rather 
than aggressively, the presence of danger more readily justifies intru-
sive police action. This part examines the common practice of frisking 
suspects, in which police officers pat down the outer garments of sus-
pects if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspects 
may be "armed and dangerous."21 Other common preventive prac-
tices include emergency searches and searches incident to arrests. 
Part IV demonstrates that danger is a factor in determining the consti-
tutionality of both aggressive and preventive actions. Part V details 
the conflict in the lower courts as to how to measure reasonableness 
when officers act aggressively. The disagreement has centered on five 
important issues: what evidence is relevant, who decides whether con-
duct was reasonable, the significance of the offense allegedly commit-
ted by the suspect, the suspect's actions, and the availability of less 
intrusive alternatives. How courts resolve these issues depends upon 
how they analyze the presence of danger. Those that find danger to 
States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (upheld a frisk of an intoxicated 
suspect because a step back away from the officer signified that he might have been reach-
ing for a gun). 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 365-425. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 365-425. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 274-288, 387-390. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 216, 281-287. 
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
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be a weighty factor give little consideration to the other issues. Those 
that properly perceive the significance of danger are more likely to 
evaluate other factors. Part VI reveals that lower courts defer to of-
ficers' assertions of danger when the officers act preventively. Part 
VII discusses the lower courts' misperception of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the results of that misperception: officers may frisk suspects 
for weapons upon mere suspicion, officers may use extremely intru-
sive means for conducting stops if drugs are involved, officers may 
view "emergencies" as opportunities for investigative searches, and 
officers may search an area incident to an arrest even if the suspect 
did not have access to that area at the time of the search. 
To properly safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, Part VIII offers 
specific guidelines to assess the presence of danger and the constitu-
tionality of both aggressive and preventive actions. These guidelines 
check the unnecessary deference courts give to police officers and 
compel courts to examine their serious misperceptions of the Fourth 
Amendment right to personal security. 
The debate between Justices Stevens and Kennedy in Maryland v. 
Buie22 captures the essence of the courts' misperceptions of the 
Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens thought a police officer was fool-
ish for searching a basement of a home after the resident of the home 
was arrested for armed robbery and taken outside.23 Justice Kennedy 
thought the search of the basement represented good police work be-
cause a second person or accomplice might have been hiding in the 
basement.24 To Justice Stevens, the mere fear of danger lurking in an 
unknown basement did not justify continuation of the search, because 
the officers had fu1filled the purpose of their entry-they had arrested 
the suspect. To Justice Kennedy, further intrusion was permissible be-
cause some danger was present. Even though Justice Kennedy's per-
spective is consistent with the trend in the lower courts, Justice 
Stevens' assessment of danger properly highlights the need to balance 
a variety of interests. Justice Stevens questioned whether the officers 
created the danger by descending the basement stairs.25 He also rec-
ognized that the officers could have exercised alternatives to minimize 
any potential danger.26 Because of the strong privacy interest in the 
home, and because the officers could have exercised alternative meas-
22. 494 u.s. 325 (1990). 
23. Id. at 337-38 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
24. Id. at 339 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
25. Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
26. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
630 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623 
ures to reduce the danger, Justice Stevens gave less consideration to 
the presence of danger. Justice Stevens' perspective highlights the is-
sues explored in this Article. This Article demonstrates that one's 
view of danger in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence significantly af-
fects the balance of interests. 
II. The Use of Physical Force to Seize Suspects: 
Aggressive Actions 
For years, suspects have alleged that police officers use excessive 
force during arrests. It was not until 1985, however, that the United 
States Supreme Court interpreted these claims as implicating the 
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable" seizures.27 In 
two decisions, Tennessee v. Garners and Graham v. Connor,29 the 
Supreme Court created a standard of analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment for claims involving both deadly and nondeadly force. 
The text and history of the Fourth Amendment were central to the 
Court's decisions.30 In both decisions, the Court assessed the amount 
of danger a suspect posed to police and the community.31 
In Gamer, determining reasonableness required balancing a vari-
ety of interests: the right to personal security (which protects both the 
suspect and society from unreasonably intrusive police practices), so-
ciety's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt, and society's interest in 
effective law enforcement.32 Assessing danger required the Court to 
evaluate the offense allegedly committed by the suspect.33 The Court 
measured the degree of danger to determine whether the danger out-
weighed the suspect's "fundamental interest in his own life."34 The 
police could only use deadly force if the danger was significant.35 In 
applying the balancing standard under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court strongly emphasized the nature of the offense the suspect alleg-
edly committed. 
The Court's assessment of danger in Gamer led to the conclusion 
that the police officer used unreasonable force in shooting a fleeing 
27. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 {1985). 
28. ld. 
29. 490 u.s. 386, 394 (1989). 
30. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-97; Garner, 411 U.S. at 8-15. 
31. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Garner, 411 U.S. at 10-11. 
32. Garner, 411 U.S. at 9-10. 
33. Id. at 11. 
34. Id. at 9. 
35. !d. 
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suspect.36 In Garner, the police-officer had probable cause to believe 
that a person running from a house at night had just attempted to 
burglarize the house.37 The police officer, who did not believe the sus-
pect was armed, ordered the suspect to halt.38 When the suspect 
failed to follow the order, the officer shot the suspect in the back of 
the head. 39 A state statute authorized the use of deadly force to shoot 
any fleeing felon.40 The Supreme Court held the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied because not all fleeing felons are dangerous.41 
To justify the use of deadly force, the suspect's offense must cre-
ate a significant degree of danger, in order to outweigh the suspect's 
fundamental interest in life. In describing the seriousness of the of-
fense, the Court appeared to create both a "standard" and a "rule:"42 
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect 
poses a threat of serious physical harm, eitl~er to the officer or to 
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape 
by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has 
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened inflic-
tion of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if neces-
sary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has 
been given.43 
The first sentence contains a standard: police officers may kill a sus-
pect when the suspect seriously endangers the lives of officers or 
others. This standard considers all of the circumstances at the time of 
the shooting. The second sentence, however, suggests a rule to deter-
mine the requisite danger: when suspects commit a certain type of of-
fense, they automatically pose a danger to the officers or the 
community. Noticeably absent from the rule in the second sentence is 
a reference to immediate danger to officers or others. The literal lan-
guage of the second part seems to suggest a mandatory presumption 
of danger for heinous offenses: until the person is caught, everyone is 
in danger. Thus, if a suspect commits an offense involving the inflic-
tion of serious bodily harm, officers may shoot him even if neither the 
officers nor the public is in immediate danger.44 Such an interpreta-
36. Id. at 21. 
37. Id. at 3-4. 
38. Id. at 4. 
39. Id. 
40. ld. at 4-5. 
41. Id. at 20-21. 
42. See Sullivan, supra note 10. 
43. Garner, 411 U.S. at 11-12. 
44. See John C. Hall, Use of Deadly Force to Prevent Escape, FBI L. BuLL., Mar. 1994, 
at 27,31 (Once suspect has committed an offense involving the infliction of serious bodily 
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tion, however, is inconsistent with the standard stated in Garner, 
which makes a logical distinction between actual danger and possible 
danger. A standard may include a non-mandatory presumption, be-
cause such a presumption still allows consideration of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, the essential feature of a standard.45 
Immediacy should be considered in calculating reasonableness. 
Under this standard, police officers must explain how they or others 
were in danger at the time of the shooting. This interpretation is con-
sistent with a statement made in Garner: "Where the suspect poses no 
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm re-
sulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of 
deadly force to do so."46 Read in context, some offenses may signify 
danger, but the degree of danger is determined by the surrounding 
circumstances. 
In assessing danger, the Court examined the history of the Fourth 
Amendment.47 At common law, police officers were permitted to 
shoot fleeing felons.48 The Court, however, refused to interpret the 
Fourth Amendment as allowing police officers to kill fleeing felons 
because modern felonies are significantly different from felonies at 
common law, which generally allowed capital punishment upon con-
viction.49 Instead, the Court adapted the common law rule to modern 
times by requiring a relationship between the alleged offense and the 
degree of danger to the community.50 It also updated the common 
law by creating a standard, not a rule, for evaluating force. 
In considering the history of the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
discussed the type of weapons available to police officers at common 
law.51 It observed that at that time officers had "rudimentary" weap-
ons, did not carry handguns "until the latter half of the last century," 
and engaged in "hand-to-hand" struggles.52 Applying the common 
harm, police officers do not need "to calculate the 'probability' of future danger if the 
suspects were permitted to escape."). 
45. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 61 ("[D]istinctions between rules and standards, catego-
rization and balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide. A rule may be corrupted by ex-
ceptions to the point where it resembles a standard; likewise, a standard may attach such 
fixed weights to the multiple factors it considers that it resembles a rule."). 
46. Gamer, 411 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
47. Id. at 12-15. 
48. Id. at 12. 
49. ld. at 13 n.ll (Although "[n]ot all felonies were always punishable by death ... the 
link was profound."). 
50. Id. at 11. 
51. Id. at 14-15. 
52. Garner, 411 U.S. at 14-15. 
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law rule regarding shooting suspects to modern times would ignore 
significant "technological" changes.53 
Thus, to determine the reasonableness of a shooting under the 
Fourth Amendment, a court must consider whether a suspect is dan-
gerous. The Court noted that assessing dangerousness is difficult, yet 
it justified this requirement by stating that "similarly difficult judg-
ments must be made by the police in equally uncertain 
circumstances."54 
In light of the difficulty in determining dangerousness, it is not 
surprising that the Court was divided on the issue of whether the flee-
ing nighttime burglary suspect was a danger to the officer or the com-
munity. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor thought the offense satisfied 
the requisite danger.55 She also interpreted the reasonableness stan-
dard of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a suspect to comply with 
an officer's command. She stated, "to avoid the use of deadly force 
and the consequent risk to his life, the suspect need merely obey the 
valid order to halt. "56 In short, she thought the way to preserve a 
suspect's right to personal security was to require compliance with an 
officer's order. She also criticized the majority for considering 
whether officers may use deadly force, rather than limiting their anal-
ysis to whether officers may use handguns.57 She wondered how of-
ficers are to know when a suspect is using a potentially lethal object. 
She questioned the limits on the use of knives, baseball bats, and 
ropes.58 In addition, she emphasized the importance of deferring to 
the judgment of police officers who have to make split-second 
decisions.59 
Dangerousness is also a factor when evaluating the use of 
nondeadly force. In Graham v. Connor,60 the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard de-
scribed in Garner also applied to the use of nondeadly force. After 
noting the balancing of interests required by the Reasonableness 
Clause, the Court attempted to provide some factors to consider in 
determining reasonableness: "the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers 
53. /d. at 15. 
54. Id. at 20. 
55. /d. at 26-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
56. !d. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
57. /d. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
58. /d. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
59. /d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
60. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95. 
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or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 
evade arrest by flight."61 The Court, however, did not explain how to 
weigh these factors. Although the Garner decision stated that the sus-
pect has a fundamental interest in his life,62 the Graham Court did not 
explain the importance of a suspect's interest in personal security 
when police officers use nondeadly force. Yet, in examining the three 
factors discussed in Graham, it is easy to discern their derivation from 
Garner. In Garner, the Court considered the same factors articulated 
in Graham: the seriousness of the offense of burglary, the immediacy 
of danger to the police officer and the community, and the need to 
capture the fleeing felon. 
In providing some guidelines for the use of nondeadly force, the 
Graham Court emphasized that the force police officers may use in 
apprehending suspects is governed by the word "reasonable,"63 while 
the force prison officials may use is governed by the words "cruel" and 
"[unusual] punishments."64 Although prison officials are liable for the 
use of force only if they act maliciously, the Graham Court explained 
that police officers may violate the Fourth Amendment even if they 
act in subjective good faith.65 A reasonableness standard provides 
greater protection to suspects because it limits the amount of force 
police officers can use based on objective factors. 
However, in articulating this protective standard, the Court ex-
plained that the standard should be applied with consideration for the 
split-second decisions that police officers have to make.66 Within that 
parameter, however, the Court emphasized that even split-second de-
cisions must be reasonable and not made merely in subjective good-
faith. Specifically, the Court held that it will evaluate the officer's de-
cision to use force from the perspective of "a reasonable police officer 
on the scene."67 
The Garner and Graham decisions thus provide only general 
guidelines as to how to measure reasonableness. An important factor 
in these guidelines is the danger created by a suspect. If an officer 
reasonably perceives the requisite immediate danger, the officer may 
aggressively apprehend the suspect to protect police officers and soci-
ety because the need to apprehend the suspect outweighs the suspect's 
61. !d. at 396. 
62. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. 
63. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-96. 
64. !d. at 398 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). 
65. !d. at 397-98. 
66. !d. at 397. 
67. !d. at 396. 
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right to bodily integrity. In recognizing the danger officers face in 
their work, the Court in both Gamer and Graham noted that it had 
previously allowed officers to conduct a limited search of suspects dur-
ing investigations in Terry v. Ohio.68 Since the Court upheld the pre-
ventive police practice in Terry and its companion case of Sibron v. 
New York,69 the Court has similarly considered the presence of danger 
in upholding numerous other preventive actions by police officers.70 
ill. Frisking Suspects for Weapons: Preventive Actions 
The need to protect police officers and innocent bystanders from 
danger is one factor courts use when determining the constitutionality 
of preventive police practices. These practices include searching a sus-
pect,71 conducting a protective sweep of an area,72 ordering a suspect 
out of a vehicle,73 taking a suspect to the police station,74 taking inven-
tory of the contents of a vehicle,75 and even testing for illegal drugs.76 
When police officers decide to frisk a suspect, however, danger is the 
only factor courts consider.77 In evaluating other police practices, the 
Supreme Court considered the government's justification for an intru-
sion.78 Terry v. Ohio79 and Sibron v. New YorJCl0 established the sig-
nificance of danger and its justification for intrusive police conduct. 
Since these decisions, danger has been an important factor in uphold-
ing numerous police practices. 
A. Danger as the Justification for a Terry Frisk 
In Terry and Sibron, the Court approved investigatory stops and 
limited searches under some circumstances. If police officers have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous, 
68. 392 u.s. 1, 24 (1968). 
69. 392 u.s. 40, 64-65 (1968). 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 153-169. 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 81-130. 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 131-148. 
73. See infra text accompanying notes 419-420. 
74. See infra text accompanying notes 163-169. 
75. See infra text accompanying notes 158-161. 
76. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) 
(suspicionless urine testing of customs agents who carry firearms is reasonable; employees 
must be able to properly exercise "judgment and dexterity"). 
77. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 43-65 and infra text accompanying notes 150-
169. 
79. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25. 
80. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64-65. 
I 
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they may conduct a "frisk."81 This search allows officers to pat down 
a suspect's clothing, and, if they feel an object that may be a weapon, 
to search further.82 This preventive action allows police officers to 
investigate crimes without jeopardizing their safety or the commu-
nity's safety. The Terry Court determined that the presence of danger 
in these circumstances outweighed an individual's interest in personal 
security under the Fourth Amendment.83 
The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow police of-
ficers to seize and search suspects even if they did not have probable 
cause to arrest them.84 Although the language of the amendment only 
refers to probable cause for warrants, the Court determined officers 
may stop someone if they have a reasonable suspicion a crime is about 
to occur, and may search a suspect if they have a reasonable suspicion 
the suspect is "armed and presently dangerous."85 The Court explic-
itly linked the officer's. ability to frisk to the officer's reasonable per-
ception of danger. 
In both Terry86 and Sibron87 the Court considered the criminal 
nature of the suspect's activity as a factor in assessing the danger the 
suspect posed to th~ investigating officer. In Terry, an officer thought 
men were about to burglarize a store because he saw them repeatedly 
walk near a particular store.88 In Sibron, the officer thought a suspect 
was buying drugs because he had spoken with drug addicts.89 In addi-
tion to considering the alleged offense, the Court in both cases also 
considered whether the suspect's actions during the confrontation 
with the officer reasonably heightened the officer's sense of danger. 
In Terry, when the plain clothes officer approached the suspects, he 
identified himself as a police officer and asked them their names. 
When they "mumbled" a response, the officer grabbed one of the sus-
pects and frisked him.90 At this point, the officer reasonably thought 
81. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
82. /d. at 29. The Terry Court implies that the intrusion is to be incremental, with 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous justifying each intru-
sion. /d. at 29-30. Frisks, which include touching the chest and groin areas, may be "an-
noying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience[s]." /d. at 25. 
83. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
84. /d. at 24. 
85. /d. at 30-31. 
86. !d. at 30. 
87. 392 U.S. at 62. 
88. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
89. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62. 
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
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he was in danger and ·thus, a frisk was permissible.91 In Sibron, how-
ever, the suspect's action of reaching into his pocket did not increase 
the sense of danger.92 The Court held that the frisk in Sibron was 
unreasonable.93 In contrast to the frisk in Terry, which was to protect 
the officer and others in the area,94 the frisk in Sibron was conducted 
to gather evidence. The Court noted the officer did not specify any 
facts from which he could "reasonably infer[ ] that the individual was 
armed and dangerous. "95 The suspect did not lose his right to personal 
security merely because he spoke with drug addicts.96 The Court 
stated, "the suspect's mere act of t~lking with a number of known nar-
cotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to reason-
able fear of life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies 
an arrest for committing a crime. "97 
Although the language of the Fourth Amendment does not refer 
to frisks or reasonable suspicion, the Court believed that the Reasona-
bleness Clause of the Fourth Amendment allowed frisks in some cir-
cumstances. Its rationale was built on a theory of exigent 
circumstances, with the frisk permissible based on reasonable suspi-
cion, not probable cause.98 It explained that police officers, who often 
do not have probable cause to arrest a suspect, still have a duty to 
investigate a crime that is about to occur.99 The purpose of the stop is 
to dispel the officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to 
occur.100 If such an investigation is necessary, police officers should 
not put themselves in unnecessary danger. The Court declared that 
91. /d. at 7. The officer thought he felt a gun and later reached inside the suspect's 
pocket and removed it. /d. 
92. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45. When the officer approached the suspect and stated, "You 
know what I am after," the suspect "mumbled something and reached into his pocket." /d. 
The officer "simultaneously" put his hand in the pocket. !d. 
93. ld. at 64-65. 
94. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
95. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64. Although the Court seemed to rely on the subjective belief 
of the officer that the suspect was not reaching for illegal drugs, the Court nevertheless 
reiterated the objective standard that it had established in Terry. /d. 
96. /d. at 64. In the alternative, the Court noted that even if the officer had had rea-
sonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed, the officer would have violated 
Terry by failing to first pat down the outer clothing of the suspect. !d. at 65-66. By thrust-
ing his hand directly into the suspect's pocket, the officer acted unreasonably. !d. 
97. /d. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected finding danger based on being part of a 
group. /d. at 65. 
98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-24. 
99. !d. at 24-25. 
100. /d. at 30. 
638 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623 
the presence of danger outweighed an individual's right to personal 
security .101 
The balancing process for frisks resembles the balancing process 
in Tennessee v. Garner102 and Graham v. Connor, 103 except that signif-
icantly greater protection attaches to the right to personal security 
when officers act aggressively. Although the suspects in both Terry 
and Garner were allegedly engaged in a burglary, the preventive ac-
tion in Terry was reasonable to diffuse potential danger from an im-
pending burglary, while the aggressive action in Garner was 
unreasonable because the officer shot the suspect to stop him from 
fleeing the scene of the crime. 
In upholding the need for preventive frisks, the Terry Court did 
not completely diminish the right to personal security. It stated that a 
frisk is a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."104 In 
evaluating an individual's right to personal security, the Court recog-
nized that the practice of stopping and frisking suspects may severely 
undermine respect for the police if they use this practice to harass 
youths and minorities.105 
Despite the strong interests in the right to personal security and 
the freedom from harassment, the Court nevertheless approved of 
frisks when officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect 
is dangerous.106 The Terry Court cited the problem of violence in 
America as a justification for its holding: 
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police of-
ficers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. 
American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and 
every year in this country many law enforcement officers are 
killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. 
Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the inju-
ries are inflicted with guns and knives.107 
In balancing the interests, the Court linked the analysis of reasonable-
ness to the analysis of danger posed by a suspect. The Terry Court 
found that sufficient danger was present because the officer had rea-
101. Id. at 23. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 32-59. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67. 
104. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. The Court noted that a frisk may include a touching of a 
person's "'anns and annpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and 
entire surface of the legs down to the feet."' Id. at 17 (quoting Priar and Martin, Searching 
and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)). 
105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 n.ll. 
106. Id. at 27. 
107. Id. at 23-24. 
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sonable suspicion to believe that the suspects were about to burglarize 
a store.108 The Court stated that a Terry frisk may be "designed to 
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the as-
sault of the police officer."109 
The suspect's alleged offense and the suspect's actions are factors 
to consider in determining whether a frisk is reasonable. In upholding 
the frisk in Terry and finding the frisk in Sibron unlawful, the Court 
aptly noted that the reasonableness of any frisk depends upon the 
facts of a particular case.U0 Although the Terry Court limited its hold-
ing to the facts of the case,111 the Court analyzed the facts of other 
cases to det~rmine whether the circumstances justified preventive 
frisks. 
B. The Progeny of Terry 
The progeny of Terry reveal that only a reasonable perception of 
danger justifies a frisk. Several decisions have discussed frisks associ-
ated with illegal drug activity: Minnesota v. Dickerson112 refused to 
extend Terry frisks to drug searches; Ybarra v. Illinois113 prohibited 
police officers from frisking bar patrons when the officers executed a 
warrant to search the bar for drugs; and Adams v. Williams114 sug-
gested that even when the alleged offense is possession of drugs, other 
circumstances may nevertheless support an officer's decision to frisk a 
suspect based on a reasonable perception of danger. These decisions 
reveal that the mere presence of drug activity does not justify search-
ing individuals for weapons or drugs. 
In Dickerson, the Supreme Court refused to extend the scope of a 
frisk to include a search for drugs.U5 The Court affirmed that a Terry 
frisk must be "strictly 'limited to that which is necessary for the dis-
covery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others 
nearby."'116 However, officers could search suspects for drugs if, after 
doing a pat down, their sense of touch gave them probable cause to 
believe the suspect carried illegal drugs.U7 By limiting the Terry frisk 
108. /d. at 28. 
109. /d. at 29. 
110. /d. ("These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases."). 
111. !d. at 30. 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117. 
113. See infra text accompanying notes 118-123. 
114. See infra notes accompanying text 124-130. 
115. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993). 
116. /d. at 2136 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)). 
117. /d. at 2137. 
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to a search for weapons, the Court barred further encroachment into 
an individual's right to personal security. 
The difficulty of assessing danger was discussed in Ybarra v. Illi-
nois,118 a decision in which a majority of the Court refused to accept 
the dissent's bright-line rule.l19 This rule provides that when officers 
are executing search warrants for drugs in a public place, officers may 
frisk the people present because guns are "'tools of the trade"'120 of 
drug dealers and buyers. The majority reiterated that individualized 
suspicion is the standard for Terry frisks. It refused to assume that 
individuals present during the execution of a search warrant were 
likely to be armed or that the presence of a group automatically en-
dangered the officers.121 The dissent, however, believed that a 
"group" danger theory was valid because the officers were looking at 
the search area and not the people present.122 In finding the frisk of a 
bar patron unreasonable, the Court noted that neither the customers' 
actions nor their attire created a sense of danger.123 
Although the presence of drugs in Ybarra did not automatically 
signify danger, other offenses can. In Adams v. Williams,124 the Court 
upheld a frisk of a suspect based on a tip that a person in the suspect's 
car had both a gun and some drugs.125 The Court held the stop and 
the frisk was justifiable because the officer had probable cause to be-
lieve the suspect did not have a permit for his gun.126 The Court's 
assessment of danger,127 however, ignored one important fact-state 
118. 444 u.s. 85, 94-96 {1979). 
119. !d. at 92-93. 
120. !d. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 
62 {2d Cir. 1977)). 
121. /d. at 92-93. The police officers had a warrant to search a bar and the bartender. 
It did not authorize them to search the bar's patrons. Even though the bar was associated 
with illegal drugs and twelve customers filled the small search area, the Court refused 
allow a general search for weapons. /d. at 90-92. 
122. !d. at 106-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that executing 
search warrants creates more danger than investigating crimes. /d. at 107. 
123. /d. at 93. The patron wore a large jacket, which could conceal weapons. The 
Court did not interpret the presence of baggy clothing as creating a need for a frisk. !d. 
124. 407 u.s. 143 {1972). 
125. /d. at 147-49. 
126. /d. at 148. 
127. /d. at 148. The facts of Adams reveal the complexities in assessing danger. At 
2:15 a.m. an informant walked up to a police officer in his cruiser and told him that a man 
in a nearby car was carrying a gun at his waist and had drugs. /d. at 144-45. In this high 
crime area, the officer walked over to the car and tapped on the window, asking the driver 
to open the door. /d. at 145. When the suspect rolled down the window instead of opening 
the door, the officer reached inside the car, relying on an informant's tip that a gun was at 
the suspect's waist. /d. The officer took the gun, even though it was not visible when he 
saw the suspect. /d. Unlike the stop in Terry, the officer did not ask any questions to 
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law permitted citizens to carry weapons provided they were li-
censed.128 In determining the requisite danger for a frisk, the Court 
seemed to rely upon the officer's mere suspicion that the driver had a 
weapon in a high-crime area at night. The dissent, however, did not 
believe the suspect's mere possession of a gun signified danger.129 
The dissent suggested that if gun control were necessary, the Court 
should "water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amend-
ment."130 However, the majority's assessment of danger prevailed, in-
dicating the Court's strong concern for officer protection and minimal 
interest in a citizen's right to personal security. 
The Court's heightened concern for police protection compelled 
it to expand the scope of a frisk to include a search of the area near a 
suspect. The constitutionality of this expanded search was determined 
by the same standard required for the frisk of a person: reasonable 
suspicion that the officer was in danger. In Michigan v. Long,131 the 
Court permitted officers to "frisk" the passenger compartment of a 
car,132 and in Maryland v. Buie,133 the Court allowed officers to con-
duct a protective "sweep" of an area while executing a warrant. 
Although the Long Court recognized that danger is present dur-
ing all traffic stops/34 such danger did not justify searching the vehi-
cles of all suspects. The Court stated that the circumstances must 
dispel his suspicion. !d. Three factors were significant for the Court: the high-crime area, 
the suspect's failure to follow the officer's command, and the informant's tip that the sus-
pect had a gun and some drugs. !d. at 147-49. The need for the frisk, according to the 
Court, did not arise simply because there was reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
suspect was involved in drugs. !d. at 148. The car's ability to block the officer's view of the 
suspect, according to the Court, created a "greater" threat to the officer's safety. !d. 
128. Adams, 407 U.S. at 149-50 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
129. !d. (Douglas, J., dissenting). In another dissent, Justice Marshall perceived the 
majority as treating warrantless searches as the "rule rather than [as a] 'narrowly drawn' 
exception." !d. at 154 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
130. !d. at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
131. 463 u.s. 1032 (1983). 
132. !d. at 1050. In Long, the search of the passenger compartment occurred when an 
officer saw a large knife on the floor during a traffic stop. !d. The officer then frisked the 
suspect and searched the compartment. !d. The search was not limited to objects in plain 
view; it included opening containers. Id. at 1036. The officer in Long lifted an armrest, 
saw an open pouch, and found marijuana. !d. The Court upheld the search of the vehicle, 
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to perceive danger. !d. at 1050. 
133. 494 u.s. 325 (1990). 
134. !d. at 1047-48. The Court had previously recognized the danger inherent in traffic 
stops in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). In Mimms the Court declared 
that police officers who lawfully stop drivers may order them out of the vehicle without any 
level of suspicion of danger. Id. at 111. The Court held that the intrusion on the driver's 
liberty was de minimis and the officers' interest in safety was significant. Id. 
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create a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous.135 In 
short, it found no automatic right to search cars when the driver is 
charged with a traffic offense. 
For an officer to lawfully search the passenger compartment, the 
facts must signify danger. In Long, the danger existed, according to 
the majority, because the officer saw a knife on the floor of the car.136 
The presence of this weapon gave the investigating officer the author-
ity to search containers in the vehicle.137 Although other facts also 
heightened the officer's perception of danger,138 the Court placed spe-
cial emphasis on the large hunting knife.139 
The Court was divided on how to accurately measure the level of 
danger. The majority refused to evaluate closely whether the officer 
could have used other means to protect himself.140 The dissent did 
analyze this factor, however, and concluded the officer could have 
protected himself by keeping the driver outside the car.141 The officer 
could then safely enter the car.142 The dissent added that interpreting 
these circumstances as constituting danger143 and by failing to scruti-
nize the means used the majority did "violence to the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. "144 
135. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14. 
136. Id. at 1050. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1035-37. The Court offered a lengthy description of the facts justifying the 
arrest: it was late at night in a rural area; the driver, who was under the influence of an 
"intoxicant," failed to respond coherently to the officer's requests for identification and 
registration; the officer saw a knife on the floor of the car; and the officer believed that the 
suspect, who was not arrested, might have access to other unknown weapons in the car 
when he returned to it. Id. at 1050. 
139. Id. at 1052 n.16. 
140. Id. at 1052. The Court declared, "we have not required that officers adopt alterna-
tive means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encoun-
ter." Id. By limiting scrutiny of available alternatives, the Court diminished an 
individual's right to privacy by allowing officers to open containers in vehicles when they 
see a weapon. 
141. Id. at 1065 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
143. Id. at 1061 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent wondered why the police officer 
should be able to search a closed container only because it "'could have contained a 
weapon."' Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1050-51). In addition, it questioned 
what objects will justify an officer's search for "other" weapons. !d. It noted that both a 
hammer and a baseball bat could be a deadly weapon. Id. Having these objects in a car 
should not allow police officers to search containers looking for other "weapons." Id. It 
also noted that the offense justifying the stop, driving under the influence of a drug, should 
not signify danger to a police officer. ld. at 1062. It contended that it "requires imagina-
tion to conclude that (the suspect] is presently dangerous." Id. at 1062. 
144. Id. at 1064-65. 
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In contrast to the extremely heightened perception of danger in 
Long, the Court's view of danger in Maryland v. Buie was more 
rooted in the actual perception of danger, rather than mere possibility 
of danger. In Buie, the Court applied the Terry frisk doctrine, and 
allowed officers to conduct "protective sweeps" as they execute war-
rants. A protective sweep allows officers to inspect "those spaces 
where a person may be found"145 if the officers have reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that danger is present. Thus, as with Terry stops, police 
officers must have reasonable suspicion of danger.146 
The Buie Court created the doctrine of protective sweeps based 
on the progeny of Terry. The Court relied on the safety concerns dis-
cussed in Terry, Ybarra, and Long.141 The Buie Court found these 
cases supported the officers' authority to search the area imbued with 
the greatest expectation of privacy-the home. The Court noted that 
in contrast to an investigation ·on the street, an arrest in the home is 
more dangerous to police officers because someone may "unexpect-
edly launch an attack."148 The only restrictions on this doctrine arise 
from the need to have reasonable suspicion that someone will harm 
the officers, and that the search will last no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the arrest. 
In establishing the protective sweep doctrine, the Court merely 
cited prior case law. It failed to balance the competing interests ex-
plicitly. Although Terry and its progeny balanced the danger to police 
against an individual's interest in personal security and privacy, the 
Buie Court focused on danger as the central factor in analyzing the 
constitutionality of frisks. 
Because reasonableness should be a flexible standard, one that 
balances competing interests, the Court has diminished the right to 
personal security by focusing solely on the mere possibility of danger. 
145. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. 
146. The task of ascertaining whether the facts create the requisite danger produced 
contrasting opinions in Buie. Although the majority remanded the case to the lower court 
for an application of its articulated standard for protective sweeps, id. at 336-37, Justices 
Stevens and Kennedy separately hinted how the lower court should decide the issue. Jus-
tice Stevens thought that a police officer's decision to go down basement stairs after arrest-
ing the person named in the warrant was inconsistent with the hypothesis that the danger 
of an attack by a hidden confederate existed. !d. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
Kennedy, however, thought that the officer's decision was sound. Justice Kennedy stated, 
"the officers would have been remiss if they had not taken these precautions." !d. at 339 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The contrasting views highlight the difficulty in assessing danger 
when it becomes the talisman for reasonableness. 
147. !d. at 333-35. 
148. Id. at 333. 
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By deferring too strongly to police safety, and by ignoring the alterna-
tives available to police officers, the Court has sanctioned police prac-
tices that interfere with an individual's personal security and privacy. 
IV. Limiting Danger: Inherent Danger During Emergencies 
and Arrests 
The presence of danger has also been a significant factor in deter-
mining the actions police officers may take during emergencies and 
arrests. Although the Supreme Court has never created an "emer-
gency" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, it has stated that of-
ficers may perform community caretaking functions and may act 
without a warrant if they have both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances.149 In ·noting that exigencies requiring prompt action 
often occur, the Court has justified police actions taken for the public 
good, even if these actions did not meet the standards for criminal 
investigations. In the criminal context, the Court has focused on pro-
tecting police when they arrest suspects. The justification for both ac-
tions is perceived danger, either to the community or to the officer. 
An examination of these doctrines reveals how misperceptions of dan-
ger can significantly erode the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A. Emergencies: Community Caretaking Fuuctions 
Under the community caretaking doctrine, police act to protect 
society during emergencies.150 The justification for the police action is 
similar to the justification for conducting Terry frisks, except the po-
lice action is intended to protect the community rather than police 
149. Although many of the exigent circumstances cases deal with the fear of losing 
evidence, see, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) (warrantless entry of 
home held impermissible; even though evidence of intoxication may have dissipated by the 
time the officer could have gotten a warrant, the evidence related to a minor offense), 
danger analysis has at times allowed officers to enter a person's home without a warrant. 
The presence of drugs and weapons may also constitute exigencies which can justify 
entering a home without a warrant. Although a federal statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West 
1985), limits a federal official's ability to enter without knocking, Justice White in Illinois v. 
Condon urged the Supreme Court to evaluate the need to knock when officers believe that 
the person to be arrested has both drugs and guns. 113 S.Ct. 1359, 1360 (1993)(White, J., 
dissenting from denial of order). Although he noted that some courts recognize exigent 
circumstances simply because drugs are inside, the decision did not address how to handle 
the entering when officers know that the suspect has just weapons. /d. 
Recently the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether police officers must 
announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence. See Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994) (officers executed a search warrant for drugs and a gun). 
150. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161. 
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officers, and, thus, the reasonable suspicion standard is inapplica-
ble.151 Under the community caretaking doctrine, the Court considers 
only whether the officers reasonably believed that an emergency ex-
isted.152 Thus, the constitutionality of the police action depends upon 
the court's assessment of whether an "emergency," or a public need 
for action, exists. 
Exigency based on the need for safety can arise when police of-
ficers enter a home without a warrant, either to apprehend a killer or 
to provide aid to those injured inside the home. The Supreme Court 
recognized this type of exigency in Mincey v. Arizona.153 In Mincey, 
the Court held that police officers could not conduct a detailed search 
of a home without a warrant even though the suspect had allegedly 
committed a murder.154 Even though murder is a serious offense, the 
Court examined all of the circumstances to determine whether the 
requisite exigency existed. The Court found an exigency did not arise 
solely from the nature of the offense because once the officers re-
moved the suspect from the house, the exigency disappeared.155 It did 
note, however, that an emergency does exist when police officers "rea-
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid" or 
that a killer or other victims are inside.156 
The Court has similarly allowed firefighters to enter burning 
buildings not only to extinguish a fire but to investigate the origins of 
the fire.157 In these cases, the need to protect police officers and the 
public outweighs the suspect's interest in privacy. -
After a suspect is arrested, the Court allows police officers to in-
ventory the suspect's vehicle in order to protect community safety. 
The Court in Cady v. Dombrowski158 stated that when police officers 
remove guns from vehicles left by arrested drivers they perform a 
"community caretaking function[ ]."159 These actions, according to 
the Court, were divorced from criminal investigation.160 In interpret-
151. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161. 
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161. 
153. 437 u.s. 385, 392 (1978). 
154. !d. at 393-94. 
155. !d. 
156. !d. at 392. See generally Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17,21-23 (1984) (officers 
went to home after receiving a call that a suicidal mother shot her husband; search after 
mother was removed from the home was impermissible). 
157. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (plurality); Michigan v. 'JYier, 
436 u.s. 499, 506 (1978). 
158. 413 u.s. 433 (1973). 
159. ld. at 441. 
160. ld. 
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ing the reasonableness of this preventive action, the Court refused to 
consider the availability of other alternatives.161 Although the officer 
in Dombrowski had reason to believe the car contained a gun, the 
Court's interpretation of the inventory doctrine did not require such a 
belief. The search was reasonable because the Court considered it to 
be administrative rather than investigative. 
The central question under the community caretaking doctrine is 
whether the balance of interests justifies an officer's intrusive actions. 
Reasonableness is determined by weighing the right to privacy and 
personal security against the perceived danger. The degree of impor-
tance one places on danger, as with the other doctrines, can skew the 
balance. 
B. Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests: Inherent Danger 
Inherent danger is a part of the justification for searches incident 
to arrests. The automatic right to search an arrested person is built on 
three rationales: preventing suspects from destroying evidence, de-
creasing the likelihood of escape, and protecting police officers.162 
Although these reasons justify the search, the Court in Chime[ v. Cali-
fomia163 stated that danger is present during all arrests.164 
Because the Court considered arrests to be inherently dangerous, 
the Court allowed officers to search an arrested person and the "area 
within his immediate control"165 for weapons. By searching the sus-
pect and the immediate area, the police officer could discover and 
seize any weapon that would endanger the officer or help the suspect 
escape.166 The Court limited the search area to the area immediately 
surrounding the suspect, to safeguard the suspect's right to privacy.167 
The Court also required the search to be contemporaneous to the 
arrest because the need to conduct a search is based on the need to 
protect the police officer. Because the officers in Chime[ had searched 
the entire house without a warrant, the search was unconstitutional.168 
161. /d. at 447. It stated: "The fact that the protection of the public might, in the ab-
stract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the 
search unreasonable." /d. 
162. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1968). 
163. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
164. /d. at 762-63. 
165. ld. at 763. 
166. /d. 
167. /d. 
168. /d. at 768. 
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The authority to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest dif-
fers from the authority to conduct a Terry frisk. To frisk a suspect, a 
police officer must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed 
and dangerous; to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest, the 
police officer must only execute a lawful arrest before the search. The 
officer's authority to search a suspect is automatically generated upon 
arrest, because the Court perceives arrest to be inherently dangerous. 
As a result, officers do not need to articulate reasons for their 
searches under these circumstances. 
Although the Court considers danger in evaluating both preven-
tive and aggressive police actions, a misperception of danger associ-
ated with the latter is more troublesome. The Court is more willing to 
tip the scales in favor of officer safety when the intrusion does not 
implicate bodily integrity. In recent evaluations of aggressive actions, 
the lower courts have readily recognized the presence of danger.169 
The lower courts have not properly weighed other Fourth Amend-
ment interests, namely the suspect's and society's interests in personal 
integrity and privacy. By ignoring the alternatives available to police 
officers, the courts have deferred to the judgment of governmental 
officials. Such deference is erroneous because mistrust of governmen-
tal officials is implicit in the history of the Fourth Amendment.170 
V. Litigating Unreasonable Force Claims 
Excessive force claims arise whenever police officers use force 
during investigations or arrests that is "unreasonable" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether the of-
ficers used reasonable force, some courts have used the presence of 
danger as a litmus test.171 Although most claims occur when police 
officers arrest suspects,172 claims may also arise when officers conduct 
Terry stops, because officers often utilize intrusive means to check for 
potential danger.173 An examination of these decisions reveals how 
courts, in trying to protect police officers and society, have under-
mined each citizen's right to personal security. 
169. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260. 
170. See generally, Maclin, supra note , at 201 
171. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260, 281-283. 
172. See infra text accompanying notes 184-339. 
173. See infra text accompanying notes 415-423. 
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A. Danger to Police Officers and the Community During Arrests 
In Tennessee v. Garner174 and Graham v. Connor,175 the Supreme 
Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment not only determines 
when police officers may arrest suspects, but also how police officers 
may arrest suspects. The Graham Court offered three factors to de-
termine whether the police conducted an arrest reasonably: the nature 
of the offense committed, the immediate danger to police officers and 
others, and the suspect's resistance.176 The Court, however, did not 
state that these were exclusive factors, nor did it explain the weight of 
each factor. The Court's indefiniteness is unsurprising, because no 
specific guidelines can precisely describe the parameters of 
reasonableness. 
Even under a flexible standard, misperceptions are still possible. 
Numerous lower courts have misread Garner and Graham as requir-
ing broad deference to police officers' statements that they feared for 
their lives.177 When courts defer so broadly, the reasonableness in-
quiry loses meaning. Assessing the danger confronting police officers 
and the community requires consideration of numerous questions. 
What circumstances are relevant to the issue of reasonableness? Who 
decides what is reasonable? What offenses increase the likelihood of 
danger to police officers and others? What movements by suspects 
create the inference of serious danger? What level of scrutiny should 
courts use in considering the availability of less intrusive alternatives? 
An examination of these issues reveals the need to give police officers, 
juries, and courts greater guidance in determining the reasonableness 
of force. Without better guidelines, courts may continue to mis-
perceive danger as the central issue in evaluating police practices. 
1. Facts Relevant to the Reasonableness Inquiry 
Although danger is a factor in determining the constitutionality 
of the use of deadly force, courts disagree on the relevant time frame 
for evaluating an officer's actions. Some courts freeze the time frame 
to include only circumstances present at the moment the officer seized 
the suspect;178 others include circumstances prior to the seizure.179 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 32-59. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67. 
176. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
177. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260. 
178. See infra text and accompanying notes 184-195. 
179. See infra text and accompanying notes 196-209. 
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How courts resolve this issue significantly affects their assessment of 
danger. 
Resolution of this issue has in part depended upon how courts 
interpret the Graham decision. In Graham, the Supreme Court stated 
that the reasonableness inquiry must be rooted in the reasonable per-
ceptions of an officer: 
The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight .... The calculus of rea-
sonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police of-
ficers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.180 
The Court thus emphasized that built into the question of reasonable-
ness is a consideration that police officers, unlike courts and juries, 
often need to make quick decisions. Yet, lower courts have inter-
preted this passage differently: some use it to construe narrowly the 
relevant facts/81 some interpret it as requiring broad deference to the 
judgment of police officers, 182 and others find the language as only 
underscoring the nature of police work.183 An examination of these 
contrasting views reveals the need for guidelines to assess relevancy. 
One of the first cases to define the relevant circumstances nar-
rowly was Greenidge v. Ruffin.184 In Greenidge, an undercover officer 
observed a woman enter a man's car.185 The officer thought the wo-
man was a prostitute soliciting an illegal act.186 Rather than request-
ing other officers for back up, the officer approached the vehicle 
180. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. 
181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-195. 
182. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260. 
183. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). In 
Dickerson, the district court rejected the officer's argument for great deference: 
[I]n some cases these tough decisions must be second guessed, for not every post 
hoc explanation, no matter how plausible or understandable, can justify every 
officer's behavior. The best a court can do is attempt to understand the situation 
as seen by the police and then apply standards of objective reasonableness within 
these confines . . . the court would point out that of course not all hindsight is 
barred in these cases; rather, only antiseptic hindsight. Judging the weight to be 
assigned to evidence is entirely appropriate, not to mention inevitable. 
!d. The court sent to the jury the issue of whether police officers had used unreasonable 
force. I d. The jury, the court held, was to determine the facts and apply the standard of 
reasonableness to the ascertained facts. !d. 
184. 927 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1991). 
185. !d. at 790. 
186. Id. 
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without bringing her flashlight.187 With her police badge hanging 
from her neck, she went to the car, opened the door, identified herself 
as an officer, and ordered the two suspects "to place their hands in 
view."188 When the occupants did not respond, the officer drew her 
weapon and repeated her order. She saw the man "reach for a long 
cylindrical object from behind the seat."189 She then fired at the man, 
causing him serious injury.190 The object turned out to be a wooden 
nightstick.191 
The Fourth Circuit in Greenidge held that two facts were not rele-
vant to the reasonableness inquiry: the officer's failure to have a back-
up and her failure to use her flashlight.192 In determining whether the 
officer violated the Fourth Amendment, the court too narrowly de-
fined the circumstances relevant to the issue of reasonableness. The 
court declared that the conditions confronting the officer the moment 
she pulled the trigger are the relevant circumstances.193 In short, the 
court refused to consider the alternatives available to the officer to 
investigate the crime. To the Fourth Circuit, reasonableness did not 
include the officer's conduct prior to the shooting that could have cre-
ated the need to use deadly force. Since this decision, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has adhered to its narrow reading of relevance.194 Other courts 
have also misread Graham to require a narrow time frame.195 
187. !d. 




192. !d. at 791. 
193. !d. at 792. 
194. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993). In Drewitt, a plain clothes 
police officer attempted to stop a person who was driving recklessly. !d. at 776. The of-
ficer, who did not display his badge, drew his weapon and shouted to the driver to stop. !d. 
When the vehicle stopped, the officer walked in front of it. !d. While he was in front of it, 
the vehicle sped forward, hitting the officer. !d. After landing on the hood of the vehicle, 
he shot the driver twice. !d. The Fourth Circuit held that the officer's failure to identify 
himself was not relevant to the determination of whether the shooting was reasonable. !d. 
at 780. After determining that there were no material facts in dispute, the court affirmed 
summary judgment for the officer. !d. See generally James v. City of Chester, 852 F. Supp. 
1288, 1295 (D.S.C. 1994) (reasonableness requires examining the circumstances at the mo-
ment the officer used force; it was irrelevant that the officer did not "station a guard at the 
entrance to the ... apartment, ... [nor] the officer's failure to employ proper back up and 
use a flash light"). 
195. See, e.g., Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332-3 (7th Cir. 1992). In narrowly 
defining the relevant time frame, the Seventh Circuit in Carter refused to consider the 
serious misjudgments of several police officers. !d. Police officers believed that a suspect 
had hired someone to kill his wife. !d. at 1329. Because the suspect frequently bragged 
that he was always armed, police officers decided to create a ruse to arrest him on a high-
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In contrast, other courts have broadly defined the relevant facts 
for the reasonableness inquiry.196 By expanding the time frame, the 
fact-finder has greater opportunity to scrutinize police practices. In 
doing so, the fact-finder may perceive less danger. 
A case that reveals the importance of utilizing a broader time 
frame is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Estate of Starks v. Enyart.197 
In Estate of Starks, the court found all of the police actions prior to a 
fatal shooting to be relevant.198 The police knew the suspect had sto-
len a taxi without the use of violence.199 The suspect later parked the 
taxi next to another car.200 An officer then parked his police car be-
hind the suspect.201 Three officers then surrounded the vehicle: one at 
the driver's window, one at the rear, and another in front of the vehi-
cle, standing behind a utility pole.202 When the suspect refused to 
comply with an officer's request to get out of the taxi, he put the car in 
reverse to give him more space to make a sharp tum around the utility 
pole.203 When the suspect drove forward, an officer behind the pole 
placed himself in danger by "moving out from behind the pole without 
way in order to protect themselves and limit the likelihood of injury to bystanders. /d. at 
1329-30. When the suspect agreed to help a stranger who was allegedly stranded on the 
road, police officers pretended to be the stranded motorist. /d. at 1330. When the suspect 
failed to get out of his car and examine the engine of the allegedly malfunctioning car, 
police officers became restless and approached him as he sat in his car. Id. One officer 
shined a flashlight into his eyes and shouted "state police." Id. The suspect began firing 
and hit an officer. /d. After numerous rounds of fire, the suspect and an officer died. Id. 
For the Seventh Circuit, the relevant time frame began once the suspect started shoot-
ing the officer. Id. at 1332. It refused to consider whether the officers had done anything 
to precipitate the gunfire. /d. at 1333. The officers' decision to arrest him on the road and 
to directly confront him as he was seated were not relevant to the issue of reasonableness. 
/d. The Seventh Circuit rooted its decision in the language of Gamer and its view that the 
reasonableness inquiry began only when the suspect was actually seized. /d. at 1332-33. 
The reasonableness question arose at the moment the officer shot the suspect. !d. It 
stated: "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures not unreasonable, unjus-
tified or outrageous conduct in general." Id. at 1332. It explained that even if the plan to 
arrest him was poor, the reasonable inquiry began when the officers seized the suspect. !d. 
at 1332-33. It also quoted from the district court, which feared second-guessing the judg-
ment of police officers: "'[a] contrary holding would create a cottage industry wherein the 
federal courts would be called upon to second guess police officers as to every discretion-
ary decision regarding time and place of arrest"' Id. at 1331. 
196. See, e.g., Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 233-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Gilmere v. 
City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 
(1986); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
197. 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993). 
198. Id. at 234. 
199. Id. at 233. 
200. Jd. at 232. 
201. !d. 
202. Jd. 
203. Starks, 5 F.3d at 232. 
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leaving [the suspect] time to stop the car."204 All three officers then 
shot and killed the suspect.205 
The Seventh Circuit criticized the actions of the officers and de-
termined that under the suspect's version of the facts, the officers cre-
ated the dangerous situation that justified the use of deadly force.206 
It noted that the suspect's original offense was nonviolent, and con-
cluded that deadly force was impermissible.207 It explained, "[i]f a 
fleeing felon is converted to a 'threatening' fleeing felon solely based 
on the actions of a police officer, the police should not increase the 
degree of intrusiveness. "208 To find the shooting reasonable under 
these circumstances would be to find reasonable a shooting of a driver 
who accidentally is about to kill a police officer.209 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not narrowly construe relevancy. 
In contrast to the Greenidge decision, which refused to consider that 
the officer failed to request back-up or to use ·her flashlight, the Sev-
enth Circuit found the actions prior to the shooting to be relevant. In 
using a broader time frame, the court considered whether the officers 
created the need to use force as a factor in assessing danger. Other 
courts have similarly allowed broader time frames in assessing the de-
gree of danger officers faced when they acted aggressively.210 
204. Id. at 234. 
205. Id. at 232. 
206. Id. at 233-34. 
207. Id. 
208. ld. at 234. 
209. Id. at 235. The court also added that the two officers who were not behind the 
utility pole had to go to trial to resolve the Fourth Amendment claim against them. I d. It 
refused to grant them immunity simply because a fellow officer's life was in danger based 
on his own misconduct. Id. 
210. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), 
cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1994). 
The Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere considered all of the circumstances that preceded an 
officer shooting the suspect. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1502. 1\vo officers believed that a sus-
pect, who had been heavily drinking, had threatened another driver with a gun taken from 
the trunk of his car. Id. at 1496. The officers went to the suspect's home and the suspect 
resisted going to the officers' cruiser. Id. at 1496-97. An officer then began beating him. 
I d. at 1497. The suspect reached for one of the officer's guns. ld. at 1497 n.l. It fell to the 
ground, and another officer shot the suspect as he "lunged toward" him. Id. In assessing 
the danger posed to the officer who shot the suspect, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
shooting was unreasonable. ld. at 1501. It stated: "[A]ny fear on the officer's part was the 
fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse .... [A] moment of legitimate 
fear should not preclude liability for a harm which largely resulted from his own improper 
use of his official power." I d. Danger was also lessened by the facts that the suspect was 
small, drunk, and lacked a weapon when the officers arrived. Id. at 1502. Danger arose 
because of the officers' provocation, not the suspect's conduct. Id. The court upheld the 
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The court's definition of the relevant time frame thus affects their 
determination of reasonableness and their perception of danger. 
Courts that narrowly define the relevant circumstances do not scruti-
nize police practices that occur before a shooting. Courts that broadly 
define the relevant circumstances do not freeze the time frame at the 
moment of the shooting, and consider the facts that occur before a 
shooting. Although the Supreme Court in both Garner and Graham 
recognized that police officers often have to make quick decisions, the 
Court did not equate deference with a lack of scrutiny. By broadly 
defining the relevant circumstances, a court acknowledges the impor-
tance of limiting governmental power that unduly infringes on an indi-
vidual's right to personal security. 
2. The Jury's Role: Civil Fourth Amendment Claims 
When suspects sue police officers for injuries incurred during 
their arrests, they allege both that the officers seized them and that 
the officers used unreasonable force. The difficulty in establishing this 
type of claim centers on the second issue-reasonableness-because 
when police officers intentionally use physical force they have effectu-
ated a Fourth Amendment seizure.211 Although the issue of reasona-
bleness seems like a classic issue for a jury, courts disagree on the 
jury's role in evaluating unreasonable force claims. The central issue 
in the controversy is whether the objective reasonableness standard 
established in Garner and Graham favors having the courts decide 
reasonableness on summary judgment. 
district court's judgment that the officers acted unreasonably in killing the suspect. /d. at 
1505. 
By expanding the time frame to conduct prior to a challenged shooting, a federal 
district judge in Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), also 
sent the issue of reasonableness to the jury. The officers in Dickerson entered a house 
without a warrant, without knocking, or announcing their presence. ld. at 392. All that 
they knew was that a shooting had occurred in the neighborhood and were directed to the 
suspect's home. !d. When the homeowner grabbed his gun to respond to unknown people 
entering his house, the officers shot him. Id. In dispute was whether the homeowner 
pointed a gun at the officers. !d. Instead of freezing the time frame at the moment of the 
shooting, the court held that the officers' misconduct prior to the shooting was relevant to 
the issue of reasonableness. !d. at 396. The court explained, "[a]cting on a hunch that 
someone could be in danger and then taking actions that could place themselves and any-
one inside in greater danger are not objectively reasonable behaviors by an officer." ld. 
The court thus determined that the issue of reasonableness required consideration of the 
officer's conduct prior to the shooting. Id. 
211. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, "Accidental" Shootings as Fourth Amendment 
Seizures, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337, 354-367 (1993). 
654 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623 
A typical unreasonable force case requires the trier of fact to de-
termine what actually happened at the scene of the arrest. Police of-
ficers and suspects rarely agree on the facts. To resolve material, 
disputed facts, juries often have to make credibility determinations. 
In doing so, the jury fu1fills its role as fact-finder.212 The jury may also 
decide how to apply the reasonableness standard to the given facts.213 
Numerous courts have recognized the jury's role, and have properly 
denied summary judgment in unreasonable force cases.214 
In contrast, some courts interpret the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Garner and Graham as requiring courts to strongly defer to the 
judgment of police officers in evaluating reasonableness.215 This def-
erence arises because courts perceive scrutiny as impermissible sec-
ond-guessing of split-second judgments made by police officers. 
Under this interpretation reasonableness becomes a means of ac-
knowledging the difficult nature of police work. With this perspective, 
many courts have misinterpreted the jury's role. 
In Krueger v. Fuhr,216 the Eighth Circuit usurped the jury's power 
to determine reasonableness by resolving a case on summary judg-
ment. In Krueger, an officer alleged he heard the suspect withdraw a 
212. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 359, 363 (1994). 
213. See id. at 364 ('"[r]easonableness vel non was a classic question of fact for the 
jury"') (quoting Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1179 (1991)). 
214. See, e.g., Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F 2d 1053, 1055 (lOth Cir. 1993) (jury must 
decide whether police officers beat handcuffed suspect with a flashlight and kneed him in 
the groin); Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (jury must determine 
whether the officer who slammed the suspect's head into the pavement was in danger, in 
light of the fact that the suspect weighed 100 pounds and the officer weighed 200 pounds); 
Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (retrial granted because a jury 
could find unreasonable the striking of a suspect in a diabetic coma for failing to identify 
himself); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1045 (6th Cir. 1992) (jury might find 
unreasonable the officers' repeated use of their guns); Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 
1348 (11th Cir. 1991) (jury must decide whether the force was objectively reasonable); 
Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
955 (1989) (jury must decide whether officer hit the suspect); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 
F. Supp. 391, 397 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (jury must determine whether the suspect presented a 
threat to the officers). 
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260. 
216. 991 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 1993). An officer in Krueger heard that a suspect had 
just assaulted someone, that he had a knife, and that he was using drugs. /d. at 436-37. 
When the officer saw a person lying on the ground and noted that he matched the descrip-
tion of the suspect, the officer withdrew his gun and ordered the suspect to freeze. /d. at 
437. The suspect got up and began running. /d. When the officer was about three to four 
yards from the suspect, the officer believed that he could hear the suspect pull an object 
from his waist. /d. Because he was afraid that he would run into the suspect, the officer 
slowed down and shot the suspect in the back and head. /d. 
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knife as he chased after the suspect.217 By allegedly reaching towards 
his waist, the suspect heightened the officer's perception of danger.218 
The court found the shooting was reasonable as a matter of law, even 
though the knife was found forty-three feet from the suspect's 
body.219 
The Eighth Circuit stated it was not concerned with the knife's 
location because an officer need not see a weapon in order to believe 
the suspect is armed and dangerous.220 The Court stated that a furtive 
gesture was sufficient; whether the suspect actually had a gun was 
deemed immaterial.221 Furthermore, the officer's decision to shoot 
the suspect in the back and head was also immaterial because, the 
Court boldly stated, "it is not remarkable that an escaping felony sus-
pect would be shot in the back. "222 It specifically refused to question 
whether, considering the circumstances, the officer should have al-
lowed the suspect to flee rather than kill him.223 Even if the Eighth 
Circuit's factual interpretations were uncontested, it is difficult to 
agree with the court's conclusion that the court, rather than the jury, 
should decide the issue of reasonableness under these circumstances. 
The Sixth Circuit also diminished the importance of the jury in 
Smith v. Freland.224 The court's review of police officers' conduct was 
extremely deferential, practically nonexistent. In Smith, a driver re-
fused to pull over for police after running a stop sign.225 A high-speed 
pursuit then occurred, during which the driver allegedly swerved his 
car towards the officer's police car twice.226 When the suspect turned 
down a dead-end street, the police set up a roadblock at the entrance 
217. !d. at 437. 
218. !d. 
219. !d. at 439. 
220. !d. 
221. !d.; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sherrod, the 
Seventh Circuit held that whether a suspect is in fact armed is not relevant. !d. at 807. It 
stated, "[W]e categorically reject the district court's assertion that fairness requires that the 
jury be presented with facts unknown and unavailable to Officer Berry at the time of the 
shooting (that Sherrod was unarmed)." !d. at 806. It also expressed great deference to 
decisions by police officers: "The Sioux Indians have a prayer that asks for this wisdom: 
'Grant that I may not judge another until I have walked a mile in his moccasins."' !d. The 
dissent, however, thought whether the suspect actually had something in his pocket would 
aid the jury in determining the type of gesture the suspect in fact had made and resolving 
conflicts in testimony. !d. at 810 (Cummings, J., dissenting). 
222. Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439-40. 
223. !d. at 440. 
224. 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1954 (1992). 
225. !d. at 344. 
226. !d. 
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of the road.227 On one side of the suspect was a fence and behind him 
was a public swimming pool.228 An officer parked in front of the sus-
pect's car and got out of his car.229 The suspect then rammed the of-
ficer's car as he started driving away.230 The officer, who was not in 
any danger, shot the driver as he headed for the roadblock.231 
The Sixth Circuit justified the shooting by hypothesizing a need 
for the shooting: the suspect was headed toward the roadblock, and 
endangered the lives of the officers at the roadblock. Furthermore, 
the suspect seemed desperate to get away, and "could have stopped 
his car and entered one of the neighboring houses, hoping to take hos-
tages."232 This latter "justification" is just plain fanciful. In determin-
ing the conduct was reasonable as a matter of law, the Sixth Circuit 
refused to consider whether alternatives were available to the shoot-
ing officer: 
[U]nder Graham, we must avoid substituting our personal no-
tions of proper police procedure for the instantaneous decision 
of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical, 
sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and 
complex world that the police face every day. What constitutes 
"reasonable" action may seem quite different to someone facing 
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at 
leisure. 233 
Although danger is a factor in determining reasonableness, the mere 
presence of danger does not justify absolute deference to police of-
ficers, or erosion of the jury's role in determining reasonableness. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Scott v. Henrich,234 also erroneously decided 
the reasonableness of a fatal shooting. The officers in Scott shot a 
suspect when he allegedly came to his door with a gun.235 
The Ninth Circuit held the officer's conduct was reasonable as a 
matter of law, even though the gun allegedly possessed by the suspect 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 344. 
230. ld. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 347. 
233. Id. at 347. 
234. 994 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992). 
235. I d. at 1340-41. In Henrich, two police officers were investigating a shooting from a 
two-story apartment. A young child stated that he had seen a man with a gun on the 
second story. One of the officers then saw a man in a window on that floor. The officers 
went to an apartment, knocked and announced that they were police. According to the 
police officers, the suspect opened the door and had a gun in his hand. The officer nearest 
the door then fired a shot, missing the suspect. The second officer, believing that the sus-
pect had fired, fired four shots at the suspect, killing him. 
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did not contain the suspect's fingerprints. Like the Sixth Circuit in 
Smith, the Ninth Circuit hypothesized reasons for the lack of finger-
prints. The court suggested that perhaps the fingerprints were missing 
because the suspect did not sweat enough, because the surface of the 
gun was "too rough to take prints,"236 or because the smooth part of 
the gun was too small for a fingerprint.237 The court found the shoot-
ing reasonable as a matter of law, despite its recognition that police 
officers should not benefit from killing the only opposing witness-the 
suspect.238 As with other courts deciding factual issues, the court 
stated it was not its duty to consider whether the police officers had 
alternatives available to them.Z39 
The Seventh Circuit usurped the jury's role in Ford v. Childers240 
by affirming a district court's grant of a directed verdict for an officer 
at the close of the plaintiff's case. In Childers, a police officer ob-
served a masked man robbing a bank.241 However, the officer could 
not see what the suspect held in his outstretched hand.Z42 The officer 
allegedly ordered the suspect to stop as he exited the bank.243 A foot 
chase ensued, and the officer allegedly again ordered the suspect to 
stop.244 When he did not, the officer shot him in the back.245 
The Seventh Circuit held the officer's conduct was reasonable, 
relying on the nature of the offense committed by the suspect-armed 
robbery-to justify the shooting.246 The court stated that this offense 
alone indicated the suspect posed "a danger of serious harm to others 
if not immediately apprehended."247 The court rejected expert testi-
mony that the officer should have considered other alternatives, and 
rejected the suspect's assertion that he did not hear the officer's com-
mands to stop.248 The court relied on language from Garner that 
stated that an officer may use deadly force on a suspect if he has 
"probable cause" to believe that the suspect has committed a violent 
236. Id. at 1343. 
237. ld. 
238. ld. at 1341. 
239. I d. at 1342 ("Officers ... need not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of 
responding to an exigent situation; they need only act within that range of conduct we 
identify as reasonable."). 
240. 855 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th cir. 1988). 





246. ld. at 1275-76. 
247. ld. at 1275. 
248. ld. at 1276. 
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offense.249 The court saw no room for disagreement regarding the se-
rious nature of armed robbery. It justified the use of deadly force 
based upon the category of the offense. The court failed to consider 
that it was the jury's role to assess the reasonableness of this shooting. 
In determining the conduct was reasonable as a matter of law, the 
court cited the split-second nature of the officer's decision.250 
Although the court explicitly warned that shooting should not be "an 
automatic response to the law enforcement officer when attempting to 
capture a fleeing felon,"251 the court failed to limit such shootings or 
have a jury determine the reasonableness of the such shootings. 
Finally, in Drewitt v. Pratt,252 the Fourth Circuit determined that a 
shooting was reasonable as a matter of law. Again, in interpreting 
reasonableness, the court granted significant deference to the judg-
ment of police officers.253 In Drewitt, a plain clothes police officer 
observed a reckless driver.254 Without displaying his badge, the of-
ficer ordered the driver to stop.255 When the driver stopped, the of-
ficer walked in front of the car.256 The suspect then hit the officer 
with his car. The officer rolled onto the hood, fired two shots and 
killed the driver.257 The court held that it could decide whether the 
officer's actions were reasonable.258 The court deemed it unimportant 
that the officer walked in front of a vehicle with no lights at night, that 
had crashed into another vehicle.259 The court stated that any dispute 
in facts was "more imagined than real," and thus the court robbed the 
jury of its role in determining whether the officer's conduct was 
reasonable.260 
When courts grant extreme deference to the judgments of police 
officers, they deprive juries of their role in determining whether the 
officers used reasonable force within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. Because a reasonableness standard does not create 
bright-line rules, juries are better able to examine the totality of cir-
cumstances in excessive force cases. Juries may help clarify important 
249. /d. at 1274. 
250. /d. at 1276. 
251. /d. at 1276 (emphasis omitted). 
252. 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993). 
253. /d. at 779-80. 
254. /d. at 776. 
255. /d. 
256. /d. 
257. !d. at 776. 
258. !d. at 779-80. 
259. ld. at 780. 
260. /d. 
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elements of the reasonableness standard as applied to the use of force. 
Two important issues for juries are the significance of the nature of 
the suspect's offense, and whether the suspect's actions justified an 
officer's belief that the suspect was a danger to the police or the 
community. 
3. Offenses Signifying Danger to Officers and the Community 
In Garner, the Supreme Court allowed police officers to use 
deadly force if they had probable cause to believe a suspect "commit-
ted a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm. "261 This language suggests that an officer may shoot a 
serial killer in the back, even if the officer himself is not in danger. 
This passage from Garner, however, should be read with the Court's 
immediacy requirement. To justify a shooting, a police officer must 
perceive immediate danger, whether to himself or the community. 
Thus it is important to determine whether certain offenses automati-
cally create an inference that the community is in danger unless the 
police immediately seize the suspect. 
The Garner Court did not specify the types of offenses that would 
allow a police officer to shoot a suspect. It merely stated that a night-
time burglary suspect fleeing from a home does not signify the requi-
site danger to allow the police to shoot him. 262 In analyzing the 
Garner decision, a few courts are heavily influenced by whether the 
suspect committed a violent offense. In Krueger v. Fuhr,263 the Eighth 
Circuit evaluated an armed assault, and in Ford v. Childers,264 the Sev-
enth Circuit considered an armed robbery. In both cases, the officers 
had reason to believe the suspects were armed and in both cases, the 
officers shot the suspects in the back after they failed to heed their 
commands to stop. Krueger and Ford appear to create a per se rule, 
allowing police to shoot fleeing suspects if the police had probable 
cause to believe the suspect committed a violent offense. This per se 
rule arises because the courts decided that the shootings were reason-
able as a matter of law. 
However, most courts do not center their analysis on the alleged 
offense. Rather, they focus on the suspect's actions during his con-
frontation with the police. When the confrontation involves a high-
261. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
262. /d. at 25. 
263. 991 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 216-223. 
264. 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 240-251. 
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speed pursuit, some courts consider the pursuit itself to be an indica-
tion that the suspect is a danger to the community.265 Some courts 
believe high-speed pursuits increase danger, and possibly justify a 
shooting.266 The Fourth Amendment does not apply when the 
Supreme Court decisions suggest police pursue suspects in cars be-
cause the police do not "seize" drivers during these pursuits.267 Thus, 
although some courts often do not scrutinize officers' decisions to en-
gage in high-speed pursuits under the Fourth Amendment, they nev-
ertheless consider the pursuits to assess whether the driver presented 
a danger. As a result of this peculiar view of the Fourth Amendment, 
some courts refuse to evaluate whether it is reasonable to initiate 
high-speed pursuits of suspects who speed,268 fail to pay highway 
tolls,269 drive through stop signs,270 skid when leaving a gas station,271 
or drive while intoxicated.272 Other courts, however, have properly 
questioned whether the officers conducting a pursuit have created the 
danger to the community.273 
4. Furtive Gestures: Inferring Danger to Police Officers 
Some courts have determined that a "furtive gesture" by a sus-
pect justifies an officer to reasonably believe the suspect was reaching 
265. See, e.g., Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1954 (1992). 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 224-233. 
267. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145, 
162 (1994) ("The history of the chase cases suggests that the Court intends to achieve its 
agenda for enhancing police power by whatever means are necessary."); Kathryn R. 
Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 270-85 (1991). 
268. See Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 7 (1st Cir. 1993). 
269. See Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1993). 
270. See Freland, 954 F.2d at 344. 
271. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). 
272. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1992). In Fraire, 
the Fifth Circuit stated that a suspect was dangerous within the meaning of Garner because 
he drank as he drove, drove erratically, and sped "through a residential subdivision, twice 
crashing the car." /d. at 1276 n.30. 
273. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1989) 
("(I]t might be argued that the substantial threat requirement was not met because any 
danger proceeded from the fact that the police gave chase. This is not to say that the police 
should never chase suspected car thieves, only that the danger created by the chase would 
not give them license to use deadly force when it is necessary to prevent escape."); Dono-
van v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1994) (jury could find that ramming of 
motorcyclist during pursuit was unreasonable; officer chased suspect because he failed to 
answer questions about a nearby explosion). See generally Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 
F.3d 1283, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994) (municipality may be liable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for failing to train police officers not to conduct pursuits for minor traffic offense 
when circumstances fndicate danger to the public). 
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for a weapon.274 To justify a shooting under the "furtive gesture" doc-
trine, officers do not need to see a gun, knife, or even a glint of steel 
because of the role of the action/reaction theory.275 
Furtive gestures can create an inference of danger because ex-
perts believe that the suspect has time to kill the officer by the time a 
police officer sees a glint of steeP76 In Matthews v. City of Atlanta,277 
a federal court judge stated that police officers may draw their guns in 
response to a suspect's furtive gesture even if they would not be justi-
fied to draw their guns under the Garner standard. The court ruled 
that to find otherwise would be to constitutionally require police of-
ficers to put themselves in danger.278 
274. See, e.g., Krueger, 991 F.2d at 437. In Krueger, an armed assault suspect had alleg-
edly made a furtive gesture by reaching for his waist. The officer, having other facts to 
support his belief that the suspect had a knife, shot him in the back. /d. The Eighth Circuit 
found the requisite danger because of the prior armed assault and the furtive gesture. !d. at 
439. 
275. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sherrod, the 
suspect had allegedly robbed a store and had previously committed other "assaultive 
crimes." /d. at 803. After police officers stopped the suspect, one officer behind the vehi-
cle had his weapon pointed at the car as did the officer who approached the car. !d. When 
the passenger failed to comply with an officer's repeated commands to raise his hand, the 
passenger then allegedly made a furtive gesture by quickly moving "'his hand into his coat 
... [as if] he was going to reach for a weapon."' !d. (quoting the police officer's testimony) 
(brackets in original). The officer then killed the passenger. !d. The court stated that it 
was for the jury to determine whether this gesture justified the killing. !d. at 806-07. In 
determining that it was not relevant whether the suspect actually had a weapon, the court 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require consideration of the split-second nature of 
officers' decisions. !d. at 805. The Seventh Circuit stated: "[C]ourts and juries must deter-
mine the propriety of the officer's actions based upon a thorough review of the knowledge, 
facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time he exercised his split-second judg-
ment as to whether the use of deadly force was warranted." Id. at 805. 
276. See, e.g., Kevin Parsons, Decision to Use Force: The Confrontational Continuum, 
in 8 CIVIL RIGHTS LmGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 115, 119-20 
(1992). Dr. Parsons, a frequent expert in trials involving the use of unreasonable force, 
described the problem of officers dealing with knives: 
Our own testing in conjunction with government contracts for the design of use of 
force training programs has shown that an individual can draw a knife from a 
concealed position and cover 21 feet to stab an individual in the face before the 
average police officer can unholster his weapon and fire one shot. Obviously, 
knowledge of such threats or lack of knowledge of such issues can have a signifi-
cant impact upon the reasonableness of an officer's actions. 
/d. at 120. Under this theory, if the officer waited to see a glint of steel the suspect would 
have been able to assault him before he could have reached his gun. Dr. Parsons also 
noted that certain circumstances need to exist before a furtive gesture could create the 
inference of danger. In his example, the suspect must be within 21 feet of the officer. 
Thus, not all furtive gestures create the inference of danger. 
277. 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (N.D. Ga. 1988). 
278. Id. at 1557. 
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To justify a shooting, police officers must reasonably believe a 
suspect has the ability and opportunity to harm them and that either 
their lives or the lives of others are in jeopardy.279 The element of 
jeopardy captures Garner's requirement that the suspect present an 
immediate danger to officers or the community.280 A suspect's furtive 
gestures place the lives of police officers in jeopardy. The act of 
reaching for an unknown object can justify a shooting if an officer 
believes a suspect has the ability and opportunity to harm her and the 
intention to kill the officer. 
Under some circumstances a suspect's movement may create a 
reasonable belief that the suspect is reaching for a gun,281 knife,282 or 
other unknown, but possibly threatening, object on the floor or back-
279. See, Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1993}. In Ellis, the Seventh 
Circuit explicitly linked the furtive gesture doctrine with the Fourth Amendment's require-
ment of jeopardy. The suspect in Ellis had aiiegedly burglarized a pharmacy. !d. at 245. 
He had broken into it by using a sledgehammer to create a hole in a back wail. Id. After 
returning the hammer to his car, the suspect surreptitiously took some drugs and money. 
!d. When the investigating officer saw the hole, he prew his gun and later noticed a person 
outside. !d. He ordered the suspect to stop. !d. When the suspect stopped walking and 
turned around, he suddenly tossed the bag containing drugs at the police officer. Id. This 
lightweight bag did not daze the officer or dislodge his gun. !d. When the suspect began 
running, the officer shot him in the back. !d. In analyzing ali these facts, the court stated 
that a jury must decide the issue whether the shooting was reasonable. !d. at 247. 
The court's discussion of furtive gestures focused on three facts: the suspect's cloth-
ing, the quick toss of the bag at the officer, and the lack of harm to the officer. !d. at 246-
47. The suspect was wearing pants and a sleeveless shirt. !d. at 245. This attire, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated, could not support a belief that the suspect had a hammer on him. !d. at 
246-47. It explained, "[w]hile it was possible that [the suspect] carried a concealed weapon, 
as much as it is possible that every felon might be carrying a weapon, [the officer] had no 
particular reason to believe that [the suspect] was armed." !d. at 247. The court, in consid-
ering the clothing and the original offense, did not believe that it was reasonable at that 
moment to believe the suspect was armed. !d. 
The act of tossing a bag at an officer could be a furtive gesture because the suspect 
could have disarmed or dazed the officer, aiiowing him to reach for a weapon. In this case, 
however, the court noted that after tossing the bag, the suspect did not reach for a weapon. 
Id. At that point, the court declared, a shooting would b~ unjustified because the officer 
could not reasonably believe that the suspect had a weapon. !d. The court wisely noted 
jeopardy is a necessary condition for a gesture to be ''furtive": "When an officer faces a 
situation in which he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any 
time thereafter with impunity." !d. Because the tossing of the bag did not result in the 
suspect reaching for a weapon, the officer could not later shoot the suspect in the back 
since he was no longer in jeopardy. Id. 
280. See generally Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) (ex-
pert testified that the three elements of ability, opportunity, and jeopardy represent the 
industry's standard for measuring force). 
281. See Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805. 
282. See Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439. 
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seat of a car.283 Furtive gestures also occur when a suspect throws an 
object at an officer.284 Under these circumstances, the suspect's origi-
nal offense may or may not influence the police officer's belief that 
the suspect reached for a weapon. If the suspect's original offense 
involved a weapon, the officer's belief that the suspect was reaching 
for a weapon is more reasonable.285 In many cases, however, courts 
do not consider the original offense and declare that the furtive ges-
ture itself signified the requisite danger justifying a shooting.286 Some 
courts also fail to consider whether the officers could have prevented 
the furtive gesture by using other means to apprehend the suspect.287 
The suspect's gesture must signify danger to the police officer 
before the police officer can justify shooting the suspect. In today's 
society, where so many citizens are armed, courts and juries may be 
more willing to assume that a furtive gesture justifies an officer's be-
lief that the suspect was reaching for a weapon. The right to personal 
security is more symbolic than real, however, if courts and juries auto-
matically make this inference without considering the surrounding cir-
cumstances. In most situations, police officers would be wise to 
ascertain other facts to support the belief of immediate danger. 
5. Lunging at Police Officers: The Need for Escalating Fore 
Other movements by suspects, though not actually furtive ges-
tures, may also increase an officer's perception of danger. In contrast 
to the furtive gestures cases, in which police officers shoot suspects 
because they fear for their lives, police officers often escalate the 
amount of nonlethal force they use when suspects "lunge" at them. 
283. See Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991) (reached toward back-
seat); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985) ("reached down to the 
seat or floorboard of his car"). 
284. See Wynalda, 999 F.2d at 247. 
285. See Krueger, 991 F.2d at 436-37 (suspect had allegedly assaulted someone and had 
a knife); Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 803 (armed robbery suspect). 
286. See, e.g., Wynalda, 999 F.2d at 247 (tossing a heavy object at officer could consti-
tute a furtive gesture); City of Killeen, 775 F.2d at 1352 (alleged sudden movement created 
danger). 
287. See, e.g., Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1991); City of Killeen, 
775 F.2d at 1353 (even if the officer negligently created the situation that made the shoot-
ing more likely, the suspect's furtive gesture justified the shooting). 
In Reese, nine police officers had surrounded a robber in his vehicle. Reese, 926 F.2d 
at 496. Even though an officer's siren made it difficult for the car's occupants to hear the 
commands to put their hands above their heads, the court nevertheless upheld a shooting 
that followed an alleged furtive gesture. I d. at 500-01. It stated that the officer's life would 
have been in danger if he would have had to shut off the sirens because the act would have 
"divert[ ed] his attention." !d. at 496. 
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The issue in this area is the degree of danger a lunge represents and 
what type of force is a reasonable response to the suspect's aggressive 
action. 
In evaluating the significance of a lunge, courts need to consider 
all of the circumstances to discern the danger presented by a suspect. 
In Tom v. Voida,Z88 a suspect allegedly stole a bicycle and smashed a 
police officer's head into the pavement twice as the officer attempted 
to arrest him. The suspect subsequently lunged at the officer during a 
struggle.289 The Seventh Circuit held that the suspect's act of lunging 
at the officer significantly heightened the officer's perception of dan-
ger.290 The court, however, did not allow the jury to decide whether 
the suspect's motion was one of surrender or aggression.291 Similarly, 
in Pride v. Does,Z92 the Eighth Circuit allowed a police officer to 
choke a suspect to prevent him from lunging at her. The court held 
that the suspect was threatening as a matter of law because of his prior 
disorderly conduct, his use of profanity, the "intense expression on his 
face,"293 and his intoxicated state.294 
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta re-
quired the trial court to determine the significance of a suspect's act of 
lunging at a police officer.295 The suspect allegedly threatened an-
other person with a weapon.Z96 In a bench trial, the trial court deter-
288. 963 F.2d 952, 955 (7th cir. 1992): The court noted that the officer did not try to use 
a chemical repellant because in doing so, the suspect would have had access to her weapon. 
/d. at 962. It also noted that the officer did not have her nightstick with her. !d. In consid-
ering these facts, the court found her conduct reasonable as a matter of law. /d. The court 
stated that the medical evidence concerning the officer's injuries and numerous witnesses 
supported the officer's version of what happen. Id. at 961. It reasoned that no other alter-
natives were available to the officer other than killing the suspect. !d. at 962. The court 
thus appeared to consider the offenses that the suspect committed prior to the shooting to 
support the officer's judgment that her life was in danger when the suspect allegedly 
lunged at her. 
289. !d. at 955. 
290. Id. at 962. 
291. !d. 
292. 997 F.2d 712, 717 (lOth Cir. 1993). The officer believed that her action was neces-
sary "in order to restrain him from lunging toward her." Id. at 714. 
293. /d. 
294. Id. at 717. The handcuffed suspect, however, thought the force was merely retalia-
tory for his comments about her sexual orientation. !d. at 714. Even though the suspect 
denied getting out of his chair, the court held that the choking under the circumstances was 
reasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 717. It relied on her affidavit, which stated that 
intoxicated people are often violent. !d. Once again in assessing danger, the court broadly 
deferred to the officer's judgment as to the need for force. Once again a court erroneously 
deprived a jury of the opportunity to determine reasonableness. 
295. 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). 
296. Id. at 1496. 
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mined the officers had provoked the suspect into lunging.297 Because 
the officers provoked the suspect to lunge at them, they could not cite 
the suspect's act of lunging as justification for their use of deadly 
force.298 In addition, the court noted that police officers' lives were 
not at risk because the suspect was physically smaller than the officers 
and inebriated at the time of the shooting.299 The court held that the 
shooting was unreasonable.300 
When suspects lunge at officers, the reasonableness inquiry man-
dates consideration of all of the circumstances. A lunge alone may 
not justify a shooting based on danger. The type of police response 
that is permissible depends not only upon the assessment of danger, 
but also upon the assessment of reasonableness. 
Courts vary in their determination of reasonableness. Some 
courts consider whether the officers had alternative means available 
to seize the suspects. Other courts refuse to consider alternatives or 
fail to discuss the role of alternatives. This can result in conflicting 
determinations of reasonableness. 
6. Minimizing Danger: Available Alternative Analysis 
Courts most frequently dispute whether the reasonableness in-
quiry should include an analysis of alternatives available to the seizing 
officers.301 The Supreme Court indirectly discussed the role of alter-
natives in Tennessee v. Garner,302 as it examined whether the police 
may lawfully use deadly force to apprehend fleeing suspects. The 
Garner Court decided that under some circumstances, the use of 
deadly force is unconstitutional even if the officers may never appre-
hend the suspect.303 In balancing the interests of suspects, society, and 
law enforcement officers, the Court recognized its decision limited the 
means police officers could use to apprehend suspects.304 The Court 
noted, however, that by prohibiting some shootings, it was not neces-
297. !d. 
298. !d. at 1502. 
299. !d. 
300. !d. at 1505. 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 184-210. In qome respects this issue is similar 
to the issue of defining the relevant time frame for evaluating the officers' actions. The 
issues overlap to the extent that they both may discuss whether the officers' actions, which 
created the need for force, are relevant to resolving the issue of reasonableness. The issues 
are different in that if the officers did not create the need for force, the issue of alternatives 
focuses only the means that the officer used to seize a suspect. 
302. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
303. Id. at 11. 
304. !d. at 9-10. 
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sarily barring police officers from apprehending fleeing suspects.305 
The Court explained that "failure to apprehend at the scene does not 
necessarily mean that the suspect will never be caught."306 In short, 
the Court recognized that police may utilize other means to seize sus-
pects rather than rely on the use of deadly force. However, the issue 
of whether the reasonableness requirement mandates courts and ju-
ries to consider whether the seizing officers should have used less in-
trusive means also arises when officers use non-lethal means to seize 
suspects.307 Most courts that have discussed the availability of alter-
natives have not clarified how closely they should scrutinize the alter-
natives available to police officers.308 Some courts equate the 
consideration of alternatives available to officers' with improper sec-
ond-guessing of police officers judgment. The Sixth Circuit has 
strongly objected to second-guessing the judgment of police of-
ficers.309 It stated, "We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized 
world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world 
that policemen face every day."310 When the Sixth Circuit does ex-
amine alternatives available to police officers, it affords great defer-
ence to the judgment of officers when the officers used nonlethal force 
to seize suspects.311 
The Fifth Circuit has also refused to explore the significance of 
alternatives. In Young v. City of Killeen,312 an expert testified that the 
officer could have utilized six different actions to aid in the apprehen-
sion of the suspect. The Fifth Circuit refused to consider expert testi-
mony regarding proper police procedure to analyze the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness issue, but did consider the expert testi-
mony in upholding the trial court's state law negligence claim for the 
plaintiff.313 The Fifth Circuit did not explain why the expert testimony 
was relevant to the negligence claim, but not to the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness claim. In another case, the Fifth Circuit also 
305. /d. at 9 n.8. 
306. /d. 
307. See, e.g., Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1993) (Graham did not 
create a per se rule allowing officers to use handcuffs during all arrests); Walton v. City of 
Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993) (handcuffing may be unreasonable if officer 
knows that it would injure a suspect). 
308. See infra text accompanying notes 314-323. 
309. See, e.g., Freland, 954 F.2d at 346-47. 
310. 954 F.2d at 347. 
311. See, e.g., Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1044 (6th Cir. 1992) (by using 
a Taser, the officer sought "to obviate the need for lethal force"). 
312. 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985). 
313. /d. at 1352-54. 
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seemed to ignore a department investigative report that was critical of 
an officer.314 The report criticized the officer for chasing a driver 
down a cul-de-sac and standing in front of the driver's vehicle, inviting 
"the truck to aim for him."315 The court never mentioned that the 
officer could have used other means to seize the suspect. 
The Seventh Circuit sent a mixed message regarding the role of 
alternatives in Tom v. Voida.316 Although the Court noted that the 
officer's only means for self-defense at the time of an impending at-
tack was her gun,317 the court never discussed the significance of the 
officer's failure to have her nightstick with her. Although a baton can 
be both a lethal and nonlethal weapon, the court did not suggest this 
omission was relevant to the issue of reasonableness. 
A similar issue arises when courts consider violations of depart-
ment procedure. Many courts believe these violations are relevant to 
the reasonableness analysis.318 All courts agree that such violations 
do not automatically signify a Fourth Amendment violation; however, 
some courts consider violations to be irrelevant to the reasonableness 
analysis.319 Both the Ninth Circuit320 and a federal district court321 
have failed to consider these violations as an aspect of reasonableness. 
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider violations of police guidelines 
dealing with barricaded suspects, because the guidelines were 
designed to protect police officers and the community, not suspects.322 
Similarly a federal district court held that even if the officers' plan to 
seize a mentally ill suspect was reckless, the plan had "no bearing on 
whether [the officer] reasonably believed plaintiff posed a threat of 
serious injury."323 
Other courts, however, recognize that the reasonableness inquiry 
requires consideration of all circumstances facing an officer. These 
courts often assert they are not using hindsight to evaluate reasona-
bleness, but are simply analyzing the officer's conduct in light of all 
the circumstances, including any available alternatives. Some Ninth 
314. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992). 
315. Jd. at 1272. 
316. 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992). 
317. ld. at 962. 
318. See, e.g., Soares, 8 F.3d at 922 (department handcuffing policy was relevant to, but 
not dispositive of, the issue whether handcuffing constituted excessive force; reasonable-
ness requires considering all of the circumstances of an arrest). 
319. See infra text accompanying notes 320-323. 
320. See Scott v. Henrich, 994 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992). 
321. O'Toole v. Kalmar, No. 85-C 7380, 1990 WL 19542, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1990). 
322. Scott, 994 F.2d at 1342. 
323. O'Toole, 1990 WL 19542, at *9. 
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Circuit decisions have highlighted the importance of this inquiry. In 
Brower v. County of Inyo, the court interpreted the Gamer standard 
as requiring two inquiries: (1) Did the suspect's conduct create a "sig-
nificant threat" to the safety of officers; and (2) "[ d]id a reasonable 
non-deadly alternative exist for apprehending the suspect?"324 The 
court stated the second inquiry was focused on whether the use of 
force was necessary and compelled the consideration of alterna-
tives.325 In a later decision, the court similarly stated that reasonable-
ness requires consideration of "alternative courses of actions" open to 
officers. 326 
In discussing the role of alternatives, the Fourth Circuit has found 
expert testimony helpful in determining reasonableness. In Kopf v. 
Skyrm,327 the Fourth Circuit recognized that experts may explain what 
constitutes the "prevailing standard of conduct" for various weapons. 
For example, experts can explain how to effectively use canines, slap-
jacks, handcuffs, mace, and guns.328 In describing these police tools, 
experts help the jury understand that while the jury should not use 
hindsight to judge the officers, neither should it use it to "absolve" 
them.329 Other courts have similarly relied upon the use of expert 
324. 884 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1989). 
325. /d. at 1318. 
326. Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 1992) (italics omitted). In Hop-
kins, an officer hit a suspect with his baton. /d. at 883. When the suspect got the baton 
from the officer, he hit the officer. /d. The officer responded by shooting the suspect. /d. 
The officer then radioed for help, reloaded his gun, and hid behind a car. /d. When the 
suspect advanced again, the officer shot him. /d. In evaluating these facts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated the reasonableness of the second shooting required consideration of alternatives 
available to the officer: 
[The officer] was armed with several weapons and could hide behind a car. [He] 
had already called for help; he needed only to delay [the suspect] for a short 
period of time. He could have evaded [the suspect], or he could have attempted 
to subdue him with his fists, his feet, his baton or the butt of his gun. 
/d. at 887. The court held these alternatives supported its denial of summary judgment for 
the officer. /d. at 888. A jury would have to consider the significance of these alternatives. 
/d. 
327. 993 F.2d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 1993). 
328. /d. 
329. /d. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony on 
the proper use of canines and slapjacks. /d. It explained that the role of experts depends 
upon the facts of each case: 
Where force is reduced to its most primitive form-the bare hands-expert testi-
mony might not be helpful. Add handcuffs, a gun, a slapjack, mace, or some 
other tool, and the jury may start to ask itself: what is mace? what is an officer's 
training on using a gun? how much damage can a slapjack do? Answering these 
questions may often be assisted by expert testimony. 
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testimony330 and have distinguished between automatic deference to 
the judgment of officers, and reasonable scrutiny of the officers' ac-
tions on the scene of the arrest.331 
The Seventh Circuit, in Villanova v. Abrams,332 stated that the 
availability of alternatives is a part of the reasonableness inquiry 
under the Fourth Amendment. In evaluating a Fourth Amendment 
claim based on an unlawful seizure during a civil commitment, the 
court held that unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is the 
same issue as unreasonableness for negligence claims.333 It stated that 
Justice Learned Hand's formula for negligence applied to the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard: negligence occurs when the 
"burden of precautions" was less than the "loss if there is an accident 
that the precaution could have prevented" and "the probability of an 
accident."334 This formula, the court observed, considers the burden 
of alternatives, a burden evaluated in light of the likelihood of harm to 
individuals and the community.335 The court explicitly measured dan-
gerousness based on the probability that the suspect would cause 
harm if free.336 It also noted that under the reasonableness standard, 
less intrusion is permitted if the person has committed "a trivial 
crime,"337 a factor specifically articulated in Graham v. Connor.338 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that this algebraic formula is neverthe-
less a standard requiring judgment on the part of officials.339 
!d. The court added that even if the jury would not have difficulty understanding the po-
lice weapon, sometimes it must permit experts to testify as to the standard for using the 
weapon. ld. 
330. See, e.g., Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1990) (trial 
court properly allowed experts to testify as to the "prevailing standards in the field of law 
enforcement" on the use of force and as to whether the physical evidence supported the 
officer's testimony as to the suspect's acts and reactions to his use of force). 
331. See, e.g., Childers, 855 F.2d at 1276 ("[A]n officer oftentimes has only a split sec-
ond to make the critical judgment of whether to use his weapon. But this fact alone will 
never immunize an otherwise unreasonable use of deadly force."); Dickerson, 844 F. Supp. 
at 396 (Sometimes "tough decisions must be second guessed, for not every post hoc expla-
nation, no matter how plausible or understandable, can justify every officer's behavior."). 
332. 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992). 
333. !d. at 796. It stated, "The test of negligence at common law and of unlawful search 
or seizure challenged under the Fourth Amendment is the same: unreasonableness in the 
circumstances." ld. 
334. !d. 
335. ld. at 796-97. 
336. !d. 
337. Id. at 797. 
338. 490 u.s. 386, 396 {1989). 
339. Abrams, 972 F.2d at 796. 
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Thus the circuit courts of appeals disagree as to how to evaluate 
reasonableness; however, all courts focus on danger, whether to the 
officer or the community. The issue of available alternatives invites 
consideration of whether officers had less intrusive means to appre-
hend suspects. This issue for some courts, however, is intertwined 
with the difficult nature of police work, which often compels quick 
decisions. Alternative analysis can therefore limit the scope of defer-
ence juries and courts afford police officers' assessments of danger. 
The difficulty of alternative analysis is perhaps most obvious 
when courts consider how police officers should apprehend suspects 
who suffer serious psychological problems. In apprehending these 
suspects, the police must not only consider the danger facing them-
selves and the community, but also the danger the suspect presents to 
himself. 
B. Psychologically Disturbed Suspects and the Danger to Officers and 
the Community 
The presence of danger is also a crucial issue when police officers 
seize an individual to protect the individual from harming him or her-
self. In this context, police have neither reasonable suspicion nor 
probable cause to believe that the individual committed a crime. The 
seizure is justifiable, because it protects the individual from him or 
herself. In evaluating whether these seizures are reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, courts focus on the degree of danger present. 
Courts have considered three different issues: whether the officer had 
probable cause to believe the individual was a danger to himself,340 
whether unsolicited assistance by police officers, known as a "welfare" 
stop, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment,341 and whether the officers used reasonable force when they 
confronted a disturbed person.342 
A number of courts have noted that when police officers take a 
psychologically disturbed individual to a mental institution, they have 
seized the individual under the Fourth Amendment.343 The issue in 
these cases is whether the circumstances known to the officers created 
probable cause to believe the suspect was a danger to himself.344 
340. See infra text accompanying notes 344-348. 
341. See infra text accompanying notes 442-462. 
342. See infra text accompanying notes 350-360. 
343. See, e.g., Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993); Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 
681, 686 (8th Cir. 1982); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991). 
344. See, e.g., Glass, 984 F.2d at 58 (officers acted pursuant to a state law that allowed 
an emergency psychiatric examination when they have '"reason to believe that the individ-
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When officers seize individuals under these circumstances, they must 
analyze the psychological state of individuals. The Fourth Circuit, in 
Gooden v. Howard County,345 described the problem of such seizures. 
It explained that although officers cannot arbitrarily subject citizens to 
psychological evaluations, the standard for such seizures has not been 
defined by courts: 
Certainly the concept of "dangerousness" which calls on lay po-
lice to make a psychological judgment is far more elusive than 
the question of whether there is probable cause to believe some-
one has in fact committed a crime. The lack of clarity in the law 
governing seizures for psychological evaluations is striking when 
compared to the standards detailed in other Fourth Amendment 
contexts, where probable cause to suspect criminal misconduct 
has been painstakingly defined.346 
After recognizing the problem of asking police officers to assess "psy-
chological" dangerousness, the court further confused this difficult 
task by placing broad ranging deference in the police officers' alleged 
facts. It found that case law had not defined "dangerousness with the 
requisite particularity" to give officers guidance as to what conduct 
compels psychological evaluations.347 It strongly deferred to the judg-
ment of police officers, criticizing the dissent for making every en-
counter with police officers into "credibility contest[ s ]. "348 In 
assessing danger, the majority thought that repeated screams from an 
apartment occupied by a single woman indicated that she was psycho-
logically disturbed.349 
In addition to assessing psychological harm, officers also have to 
consider danger in the manner of their seizures. Sometimes officers 
have to use force to control a psychologically disturbed individual. 
When courts consider these claims, the officers generally assert that 
their forceful actions were in self-defense. What began as an act to 
render aid became an act of self-protection. Although this type of 
self-defense claim is similar to the assertions officers make in defend-
ing their use of force during arrest, the context is different because the 
officer is dealing with psychologically impaired citizens. A few cases 
have examined the use of force against such individuals. 
ual has mental disorder and that there is clear and imminent danger of the individual's 
doing bodily harm to the individual or another"') (quoting state Jaw); Maag, 960 F.2d at 
776 (officer had probable cause to believe that suspect was a danger to himself). 
345. 954 F.2d 960, 968 (4th Cir. 1992). 
346. Id. 
347. Id. 
348. ld. at 966 n.l. 
349. Id. 
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When a suspect is psychologically impaired, many courts do not 
discuss whether the suspect's condition affects the determination of 
reasonableness. In Krueger v. City of Algoma,350 the Seventh Circuit 
did not discuss the officer's failure to know that a driver was suicidal, 
even though other officials knew. The court never questioned 
whether the officer should have used other means to seize the dis-
turbed driver. 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Russo v. City of Cincinnat{351 never 
mentioned whether officers should closely examine the means they 
use to seize a person believed to be both suicidal and homicida1.352 In 
analyzing the use of force, the court appeared to show greater defer-
ence to the officer's decision to use nonlethal force to seize the indi-
vidual than to the officer's decision to use lethal force.353 Perhaps, by 
sanctioning the initial use of a Taser on the subject, the court recog-
nized the volatile task of seizing a disturbed individual. 
The question of whether an officer shot a mentally unbalanced 
person in self-defense was an issue for the jury in Samples v. City of 
Atlanta.354 An officer observed a person in a telephone both "scream-
ing like a demented person."355 When the officer approached the per-
son, he threw a bottle at the officer.356 The individual then 
approached the officer with a knife, and the officer shot him until he 
fell to the ground.357 In determining that the lower court erred in 
granting summary judgment for the officer, the court did not mention 
350. 1 F.3d 537, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1993). The court granted summary judgment for the 
officer, who stopped the driver. Id. at 540. Prior to committing a traffic violation, the 
driver had been taken into custody and threatened to kill himself if he got a ticket. !d. at 
538. After the parents notified the police that his son had taken a gun, an officer stopped 
the son. Id. at 538-39. According to the officer, the individual got out of the car, pointed a 
gun at the officer, who hid behind his car. !d. at 539. The driver then attempted suicide by 
shooting himself. !d. In analyzing the stop, the court justified the stop because the driver 
had allegedly committed a traffic offense. !d. at 540. It appeared immaterial to the court 
that the police department knew that the driver was suicidal. The court never mentioned 
whether the officer should have seized the suspect in another manner. 
351. 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992). 
352. Id. at 1044. 
353. Id. at 1044-45. It twice stated that the use of nonlethal force demonstrated "an 
effort to obviate the need for lethal force." !d. 
354. 846 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1988). 
355. Id. at 1331. 
356. ld. 
357. Id. at 1331-32. Another court has held that once an officer lawfully shoots an 
individual, the officer may continue to shoot until the suspect ceases presenting any harm. 
O'Neal v. DeKalb County, 667 F. Supp. 853, 858 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("[T]he Constitution 
does not require police officers to use a minimum of violence when attempting to stop a 
suspect from using deadly force against police officers or others."). 
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whether the officer properly approached the demented individuaP58 
The court only stated that a jury must resolve the disputed facts.359 
Thus, when officers encounter psychologically disturbed individu-
als, the courts do not seem to analyze the means officers use to appre-
hend these individuals, nor do they question whether the act of 
dealing with these individuals affects the reasonableness analysis. As 
with "welfare stops,"360 the courts recognize that officers need to seize 
unbalanced individuals who may be a danger to themselves, police of-
ficers and society. Many courts appear to decide that danger was 
present, but do not set limits on when action based on danger unnec-
essarily infringes on the right to privacy and personal security. 
VI. Litigating Preventive Actions: Asserting Authority and 
Self-Protective Searches 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
allow police officers to conduct protective searches, under some cir-
cumstances, when they investigate crimes. As with the use of force in 
apprehending suspects, the means officers use to conduct their investi-
gations must be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Courts typically find protective searches to be reasonable when 
officers act to safeguard their well-being. Courts have allowed officers 
to conduct Terry frisks,361 to search suspects incident to the officers' 
arrest,362 to search areas that pose a danger to the officers,363 and to 
enter a home without knocking and without a warrant in order to 
safeguard their lives or the lives of others.364 Often these actions are 
deemed reasonable because they decrease the potential harm to the 
officers or others. Preventive searches raise two important issues: (1) 
what types of circumstances signify danger justifying the use of pre-
ventive measures; and (2) if danger is present, what types of preven-
tive measures are constitutionally reasonable? An examination of the 
decisions discussing preventive actions reveals the complexity of these 
issues and the trend towards affording police officers great deference 
in their assessment of danger. 
358. ld. at 1333. 
359. Id. at 1332-33. 
360. See infra text and accompanying notes 442-462. 
361. See infra text accompanying notes 367-405. 
362. See infra text accompanying notes 463-474. 
363. See infra text accompanying notes 404-405. 
364. See infra text accompanying notes 442-444. 
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A. Danger during Terry Stops: Protective Frisks and Protective 
Sweeps 
To lawfully frisk a suspect, police officers must believe that dan-
ger is present. In Terry v. Ohio,365 the Court stated that a frisk is 
lawful if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect 
"is" armed and dangerous or that the suspect "may be" armed and 
dangerous.366 Since this decision in 1968, there is little doubt that 
courts only require reasonable suspicion that the suspect "may be" 
armed. 367 Similarly courts today allow officers to use more intrusive 
actions to protect themselves than previous courts would have al-
lowed.368 Today, many courts and officers perceive the high degree of 
danger when officers seize suspects. 
To justify frisking a suspect, an officer must articulate why he 
thought the suspect was potentially armed.369 If an officer sees a gun 
on a suspect before he lawfully stops him,370 the officer clearly has 
reason to believe the suspect is armed. An officer also has reason to 
believe a suspect is armed when the officer has a reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect just committed an offense using a weapon, even if the 
officer did not see the weapon. In most situations, however, the cir-
cumstances are less clear cut, and courts and officers simply draw in-
ferences from the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Thus, it is 
important to determine what type of circumstances reasonably signify 
danger justifying a frisk. Most courts consider all of the circumstances 
in analyzing whether a suspect may have been armed and danger-
ous,371 which is logical, because the reasonableness inquiry mandates 
that the courts weigh all the circumstances. Nevertheless, courts give 
particularly strong weight to certain factors. 
An anonymous tip that an individual at a particular location was 
armed persuaded two courts in two separate cases to find a frisk rea-
365. 392 u.s. 1, 24 (1967). 
366. Id. at 30. 
367. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299,304 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (In the past, the 
standard might have required a belief that the suspect was armed; today the standard is 
that the suspect may have been armed). 
368. /d. (Modem courts approve of preventive actions that "might have raised judicial 
eyebrows at the time the Terry decision was issued."). 
369. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
370. For an excellent discussion of lawful Terry stops, see Tracey Maclin, The Decline of 
the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 
1258, 1264-83 (1990). 
371. See infra text accompanying notes 377-390. 
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sonable.372 Although the only corroborating evidence in these cases 
was that the police located the described person, both the Court of 
Appeal for the District of Columbia and Second Circuit found the 
stop and the frisk procedures to be reasonable under the circum-
stances.373 These courts held that a frisk was the only way the officers 
could safely investigate the alleged crime of possessing a gun.374 The 
Second Circuit did not want to require an officer to "wait until the 
individual brandishes or uses the gun.'ms Both courts relied on statis-
tics to show the prevalence of gun possession and to document the 
danger from the misuse.376 
Courts also strongly weigh facts indicating that a suspect has a 
history of using weapons to commit crime. Although no courts have 
found this fact to be dispositive in upholding a Terry frisk, one court 
seemed to suggest that this fact goes a long way towards establishing 
372. United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Clipper, 973 
F.2d 944, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1992}. 
373. Id. 
374. ld. 
375. Bold, 19 F.3d at 104. 
376. ld.; Clipper, 973 F.2d at 951. The Second Circuit in Bold described in detail the 
dangers of guns throughout the nation and in New York, the place where the frisk 
occurred: 
The district court painted a frightening picture when it noted that (1) 200 million 
handguns and other lethal weapons are in circulation in the United States, (2) 
more than 4.2 million firearms are added to that total each year, and (3} these 
weapons caused some 37,000 gunshot deaths in the United States in 1990, and 
approximately 259,000 nonfatal injuries .... Moreover, New York City has a pop-
ulation of approximately eight million, yet as the district court found, only 
122,137 pistols are licensed in the city. Those circumstances might be supple-
mented by the facts that (1} the City of New York, where those officers served 
and protected, has a well-documented history of illegal hand-gun possession ... 
and (2} New York State has approximately eighteen million people according to 
the 1990 census, yet has only issued gun permits to approximately eighteen thou-
sand people a year from 1982 to 1992 .... In short, the overwhelming majority of 
the people in New York State and City are not licensed to carry handguns. 
Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citations omitted}. In citing these statistics, the court was attempting 
to justify the officer's belief both that the stop and frisk were reasonable, despite the Sec-
ond Amendment, which allows citizens to bear arms. See generally STEPHEN P. HAL-
BROOK, A RIGHI" TO BEAR ARMs: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS oF RIGHTS AND 
CoNSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, at x (1989) ("The complete history of the right to keep 
and bear arms remains hidden in many respects."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoRDoN 
HAWKINS, THE CmzEN's GuiDE TO GUN CoNTRoL 146 (1987) ("[T]here is a neat role 
reversal in the mostly liberal advocates of gun control urging reliance on settled precedent 
while many conservative anticontrol partisans plead for a radical judicial reinterpretation 
of this element of the Bill of Rights."); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and 
the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1254 (1994) (the Second Amendment right 
to bear arms is limited; one may not have a right to own a howitzer or to carry a weapon 
into courtrooms or schools); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't 
About Hunting, 34 How. L.J. 589, 597 (1991} (Second Amendment is about liberty). 
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the requisite danger. In State v. Valentine,377 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court upheld a frisk,378 stating that the fact that the suspect had previ-
ously used a weapon to commit a crime did not automatically create 
an inference of danger.379 The court explained that other facts con-
tributed to the officer's reasonable suspicion, such as the suspect's 
presence in a high-crime area late at night and his "weak alibi" when 
asked what he was doing.380 However, these circumstances are fre-
quently present during most police stops. The court emphasized the 
need for officer safety, noting that it "'should not set the test of suffi-
cient suspicion that the individual is 'armed and presently dangerous' 
too high when protection of the investigating officer is at stake."'381 
Deference to the officer's split-second judgment was appropriate, the 
court stated, because the decision could have "life-and-death conse-
quences."382 The court thus considered the frisk reasonable because it 
was a minimal intrusion and because there was a great need for officer 
safety.383 
Another fact often justifying a frisk is the type of crime the sus-
pect allegedly committed. For some courts, certain crimes automati-
cally create an assumption that a weapon is present. Numerous courts 
today believe that if an officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
the suspect possesses drugs, the officer also has a reasonable suspicion 
to believe the suspect has a weapon.384 When courts draw this infer-
ence, they automatically uphold the officer's frisk. Some courts, how-
ever, limit the presumption by requiring officers to reasonably believe 
the suspects were involved in "serious" drug offenses, such as heavy 
377. See, e.g., State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1994). 
378. Id. at 514. 
379. ld. at 510-11. 
380. ld. 
381. Id. at 509 (quoting United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973)). 
382. Valentine, 636 A.2d at 509. 
383. Id. at 513-14. 
384. See, e.g., United States v. cannon, 15 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1994) (frisk pennissi-
ble when officer reasonably believed that suspect was a cocaine dealer); United States v. 
Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) ("drug trafficking ... created a wholly credible 
concern that at least some of the suspects might be anned"); United States v. Alexander, 
907 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1990) ("this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the dangerous 
nature of the drug trade and the genuine need of law enforcement agents to protect them-
selves from the deadly threat it may pose"); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 
1977) (guns are "tools of the trade" for narcotics dealers); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 
169 (Ohio 1993) ("right to frisk is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of 
committing a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be anned"). 
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drug trafficking or selling cocaine.385 Other offenses such as rob-
bery386 may also create an automatic presumption that the suspect has 
a weapon. 
Actions, such as furtive gestures, by suspects or passengers in a 
vehicle may also signify danger. As with unreasonable force claims, 
furtive gestures often allow officers to frisk an individual on the 
street387 or in a car.388 In most cases, unexplained hand movement 
constitutes a furtive action, and create a reasonable belief that the in-
dividual is reaching for a weapon, because many courts believe that 
traffic stops are inherently dangerous.389 The Fifth Circuit interpreted 
a suspect's act of stepping back after an officer ordered the suspect to 
385. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 542 A.2d 912, 916 (N.J. 1988). But see State v. Guy, 492 
N.W.2d 311, 316 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993) ("To require police to 
distinguish between major and insignificant dealers or users before making a limited frisk 
for weapons would be impractical and could unreasonably put officers in danger." Yet the 
court refused to apply an automatic frisk rule, stating that "the constitutionality of each 
such frisk will continue to depend upon its facts."). 
386. See, e.g., United States v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1972). But see People 
v. Hampton, 606 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (1994) (even if officer had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that suspect was about to rob a taxidriver, frisk was unreasonable). 
387. See, e.g., United States v. Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (suspect, 
who had a "cocky attitude," exited bar with drink in one hand and his hand in his pocket; 
officer thought the hand should not have stayed in the pocket so long); Poole v. State, 639 
So.2d 96,97-98 (Fla. 1994) (drug suspect, who reached for his waistband and put something 
in his pocket, refused to take his hand out of his pocket, creating a "bulge"). 
388. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (frisk of 
suspect and car were reasonable; the driver "leaned forward at a forty-five degree angle for 
several seconds"); People v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 871 (Colo. 1993) (officer properly 
frisked fanny pack after passengers in the back seat appeared to be putting something 
underneath the seat); State v. Smith, 637 A.2d 158, 168-9 (N.J. 1994) (person in back seat 
of car leaned forward, possibly passing an object; the passenger appeared nervous, cried 
after officer told her he was going to frisk her; her later statement, "It's not mine, they 
made me put it in there," justified the frisk). 
389. See, e.g., United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1993) (stopping car with 
three passengers, one of whom may have violated parole, was "potentially dangerous"); 
Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96, 101 (App. D.C. 1992) ("While the progress of the 
auto may have stopped at the time [the officer] arrived, there was nothing to suggest or 
show to the responding officers the danger was over."). But see State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 
947, 963 (N.J. 1994). In Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court, after noting the danger 
arising from traffic stops, determined that some police practices designed to protect of-
ficers can be too intrusive: 
We are mindful that police officers are at risk whenever they make a vehicular 
stop, and that a significant percentage of assaults on police officers occur in the 
course of traffic stops .... Nevertheless, out of the substantial number of ordinary 
citizens who might on occasion commit commonplace traffic offenses, the vast 
majority are unarmed. 
ld. at 960. It held that under its state constitution that officers could not automatically 
search a vehicle when the driver is arrested for a traffic offense. ld. at 959. 
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stop, as indicating that the suspect was giving "himself [some] space to 
draw a weapon. "390 
Some courts more readily perceive danger when an officer con-
ducts an investigation with many individuals present. No court would 
justify a frisk of an individual just because the person was part of a 
group; however, when one person in a group may be involved in 
crime, some courts more easily draw the inference of danger and per-
mit the officer to act preventively. 
An extreme example of how some courts readily conclude that a 
person is armed is the federal district court case of United States v. 
Jaramillo.391 In Jaramillo, officers believed that a man returning from 
the restroom in a small bar might be armed because two other men 
had tossed a gun on the floor when the police ordered everyone in the 
bar to freeze.392 The court held the officer's frisk of the suspect was 
reasonable because the person was standing near the men who previ-
ously had a gun.393 The presence of an actual gun aided the belief that 
another person in a bar may have one as well. 
Other courts394 have similarly relied upon a "group danger" the-
ory. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals395 interpreted the presence of 
many individuals as justifying two contrasting police actions: an officer 
was allowed to frisk a suspect in part because the presence of three 
390. United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992). In Rideau, the dissent 
properly criticized the majority for allowing a frisk of an alleged inebriated person just 
because he stepped backward: 
[I]f [the suspect] had stepped forward, [the officer] most certainly would have 
viewed it as threatening. Had the defendant stepped to the right or left, it would 
have been interpreted as nervousness or an attempt to flee. If [the suspect] had 
remained stiffly frozen in place, it would have been viewed, presumably, as a 
show of guilt or of abnormal behavior caused by drugs or alcohol. 
Perhaps if [the suspect] had graduated from charm school and had been 
taught how to look "cool and collected" in the face of approaching uniformed 
officers, he could have managed to avoid the patdown. · 
Id. at 1581. (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that by finding danger justifying the 
frisk, the majority nullified the Fourth Amendment right to personal security. I d. at 1584-
85 (Smith, J., dissenting). It explained that although officers do often face danger, the 
Fourth Amendment does protect them from unnecessary danger: to frisk, they must have 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. ld. at 1585 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
391. 822 F. Supp. 118, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
392. Id. at 119-20. 
393. Id. at 120. 
394. See, e.g., United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1993) (Officers "knew 
that they were entering a potentially dangerous situation by stopping a truck with three 
passengers, one of whom they believed to be a parole violator."); see also United States v. 
Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1993). 
395. Michel/etti, 991 F.2d at 185. 
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men near the suspect increased the officer's sense of danger; the frisk 
of the suspect was permissible to protect the three men and the officer 
from possible danger by the suspect.396 Officers also sometimes assert 
that the sense of danger was heightened because of the suspect's atti-
tude.397 One court approved of the frisking of young disorderly kids 
who wore baggy clothing because the Court felt the youth's bold be-
havior could indicate they carried a weapon.398 
Another important issue is whether a person's presence at a loca-
tion that officers are searching to find illegal drugs inherently signifies 
that the person present is armed and dangerous.399 The Supreme 
Court refused to address this issue in Guy v. Wisconsin;400 only Jus-
tices White and Thomas, in their dissent from the Court's denial of 
certiorari, thought assessing danger in this context was necessary to 
resolve the sharp conflict in the lower courts.401 Some courts uphold 
these types of frisks by automatically drawing two inferences: people 
present must have some involvement with drugs and people involved 
with drugs often possess weapons.402 Other courts, however, hold that 
a person's mere presence at a searched place is too tenuous a connec-
396. /d. The court upheld the frisk of a person who exited a bar with a drink in one 
hand and his hand in his pocket: 
The officer appreciated the risk involved if indeed there was some criminal intent 
on the part of the four men. The officer also surmised, in the alternative, that the 
three men and the police might be in danger if the [suspect] had ill intent and was 
actually armed. The fact that he kept his right hand in his pocket at all times, 
given the surrounding circumstances, was reason enough to suspect [him] of pos-
sibly being armed and warranted the pat down frisk for the officers' and, possibly, 
the bystanders' safety. 
/d. The court thus found that a frisk was permissible in part because of the danger 
presented by four individuals and in part because of the need to protect three of those 
same individuals. 
397. United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 1994) (disorderly conduct by 
suspect increases sense of danger); Michel/etti, 991 F.2d at 185 (suspect had "a bit of a 
cocky attitude"). 
398. Villanueva, 15 F.3d at 199 ("With the plethora of gun carrying, particularly by the 
young, we must have sympathy, to an extent, with police officers' apprehension."). In Vil-
lanueva, the First Circuit noted that baggy clothing can increase an officer's sense of dan-
ger: "While defendant's clothing was in current style, and so could not affirmatively be 
held against him, its capacity for concealment was not irrelevant." /d. (citations omitted). 
The type of clothing that the suspects were wearing thus became one fact increasing the 
officer's sense of danger. 
399. See United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1577, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding 
frisk of person who had just left an apartment that the officers were just about to search; 
court determined that an officer reasonably believed that he was in danger by having the 
person "behind" him as he executed the search warrant for drugs). 
400. 113 S. Ct. 3020, 3021 (1993). 
401. /d. 
402. /d. (collecting cases). 
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tion to drug activity.403 The central issue in this disagreement is the 
court's assessment of danger. 
A person present when officers conduct protective sweeps while 
executing an arrest warrant may also be subject to frisking. In a pro-
tective sweep, officers search an area rather than a person. To frisk a 
person at the scene, officers must have a reasonable suspicion that the 
person present pos~s a danger. Some courts believe the presence of 
drugs justifies such searches404 while other courts believe the connec-
tion between drugs and danger is too remote to justify a search of 
persons present.405 
Courts will consider all the facts known to an officer in determin-
ing whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that 
either a search of an area or a person was necessary. While many 
courts refrain from finding a single fact dispositive, they nevertheless 
use common circumstances such as a high-crime area or the lateness 
of the hour to create an inference of danger. When officers frisk indi-
viduals or search areas, courts seem to easily conclude that the requi-
site danger was present. Such conclusions are often rooted in the 
need for officers to take preventive actions to minimize the harm to 
themselves and sometimes to others. This deference is also apparent 
when courts evaluate the means officers use during Terry stops. 
B. Preventive Actions During Terry Stops 
An officer's perception of danger determines whether an officer 
may constitutionally execute a Terry stop. As with the use of force to 
arrest a suspect, reasonableness is the standard, and courts view this 
403. Id. (collecting cases). 
404. See, e.g., United States v. Home, 4 F.3d 579, 586 (8th Cir. 1993) (Protective sweep 
was permissible because officers, while executing a search warrant for a fugitive at a home 
where drugs had been previously seized, "had no way of knowing how many people were 
there."); United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 131 n. 20 (5th Cir. 1992) (valid search of 
pouch in a car because "[w]eapons and violence are frequently associated with drug 
transactions"). 
405. See, e.g., United States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 654-55 (E.D. Tex. 1991) 
(search of van was not a protective sweep). A federal district court in McQuagge explicitly 
rejected the link between drugs and weapons: 
The Court has ... repeatedly repudiated the notion that peace officers can as-
sume danger merely from the nature of a crime, the area in which the confronta-
tion occurred, or the likelihood of danger in a situation. These pronouncements 
similarly mandate that this court reject the idea that the peace officers can assume 
danger merely because many, or even most drug dealers are armed and 
dangerous. 
Id. at 654. Thus, the court did not infer that because a suspect was involved with drugs he 
had a gun in his van. 
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standard with the same focus-danger to the officers. In evaluating 
whether an officer used unreasonable force, most courts have applied 
the factors to distinguish Terry stops from arrests. The Seventh Cir-
cuit,406 however, has also considered the three factors detailed in Gra-
ham v. Connor: the type of crime, the threat to officers and others, 
and the suspect's resistance and flight.407 Examination of the methods 
officers use to execute Terry stops reveals that the perception of dan-
ger has permitted officers to use psychologically and physically intru-
sive force during Terry stops. 
Most courts analyze the totality of the circumstances to evaluate 
whether the actions of police officers during Terry stops were reason-
able.408 The Eighth Circuit4°9 has specified factors, which other courts 
have also applied,410 to evaluate an officer's use of force: 
the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of 
the crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect 
might be armed, the strength of the officers' articulable, objec-
tive suspicions, the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements 
by the persons under observation, and the need for immediate 
action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have 
made the stop in less threatening circumstances.411 
406. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1993) (tackling sus-
pect during stop was reasonable); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (hand-
cuffing during stop was reasonable). 
407. Professor Richard Williamson has also properly noted that the means officers use 
during Terry stops should be evaluated in light of the Fourth Amendment standard articu-
lated in Tennessee v. Gamer. Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared 
Values: The Fourth Amendment and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 
379,403 (1993) ("Just as killing a fleeing felon suspect under certain conditions may consti-
tute an unreasonable means of seizing a person, so too would the use of excessive force or 
other debilitating tactics-such as handcuffing-during the period of a nonarrest 
detention."). 
408. See, e.g., United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); 
United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). 
409. Jones, 159 F.2d at 638-40. 
410. See, e.g., Perea, 986 F.2d at 644-45. The Second Circuit in Perea listed the following 
factors to aid courts in distinguishing arrests from stops: 
The amount of force used by police, the need for such force, and the extent to 
which the individual's freedom of movement was restrained, and in particular 
such factors as the number of agents involved; whether the target of the stop was 
suspected of being armed; the duration of the stop; the physical treatment of the 
suspect, including whether or not handcuffs were used. 
!d. at 645 (citations omitted). The court stated that if the force used was too intrusive for a 
stop, then the suspect was de facto arrested. Id. Accord United States v. Hastamorir, 881 
F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989). 
411. Jones, 759 F.2d at 639-40. 
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These factors raise many of the same factual issues that courts con-
sider when officers act aggressively and use force to arrest a suspect: 
the alleged crime committed, the need to act quickly for protection, 
and the suspect's resistance and furtive gestures. In analyzing the 
methods police use to execute a Terry stop, courts grant broad defer-
ence to police officers' decisions. During Terry stops, police officers 
are required to use means that quickly "confirm or dispel their suspi-
cions,"412 some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. Sharpe413 as requiring minimal 
scrutiny. In Sharpe, the Court stated that courts should not indulge in 
unrealistic second-guessing: 
The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, 
have been accomplished by "less intrusive" means does not, by 
itself render the search unreasonable. The question is not sim-
ply whether some other alternative was available, but whether 
the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize it or to pur-
sue it.414 
As with the force used during arrests, reasonableness is the touch-
stone for evaluating the use of force during Terry stops. 
As a result of this perceived deference and danger, courts usually 
uphold Terry stops, even though the officers used intrusive means gen-
erally associated only with arrests.415 In executing Terry stops, officers 
have pointed guns at suspects,416 handcuffed417 and tackled sus-
412. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). 
413. 470 u.s. 675 (1985). 
414. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,447 (1973}}. 
415. See, e.g., United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1994) ("For bet-
ter or for worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of 
suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures either of force 
more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory detention."); United 
States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991) 
("Use of force during a Terry stop does not convert the stop into an arrest if the force is 
justified by concern for the safety of the officer or others."). 
416. See, e.g., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1227 ("'It is not nice to have a gun pointed at you by a 
policeman but it is worse to have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex 
tradeoff involved in any proposal to reduce (or increase) the permissible scope of investi-
gatory stops."') (quoting United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988)); 
United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Courts have generally upheld 
... stops 'with weapons drawn."') (quoting United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S 1097 (1987)); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 
1463 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("Although effectuating a Terry stop by pointing guns at a suspect 
may elevate a seizure to an 'arrest' in most scenarios, it was not unreasonable under these 
circumstances."); Sanders, 994 F.2d at 205 ("Other circuits have held uniformly that, in and 
of itself, the mere act of drawing or pointing a weapon during an investigatory detention 
does not cause it to exceed the permissible bounds of a Terry stop or to become a de facto 
arrest.") (collecting cases). But see People v. Hampton, 606 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. App. 
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pects,418 compelled suspects to lie on the ground,419 and put suspects 
in police cruisers.420 Although the courts have not created per se rules 
Div. 1994) (both stop and frisk were invalid; officer, who thought a cab driver was being 
robbed in a high-crime area, impermissibly pointed his gun at a suspect). 
417. See, e.g., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228 ("Handcuffing-once highly problematic-is be-
coming quite acceptable in the context of a Terry analysis."); United States v. Wilson, 2 
F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit in Wilson upheld the officer's decision 
to handcuff a suspect during a Terry stop because of its assessment of danger: 
[T]he encounter occurred in the dead of night in a residential community. We 
have no information about how well illumined the area was, but it is safe to as-
sume that the hour considerably increased the potential danger level. Further-
more, when he finally accosted [the suspect], [the officer] was not accompanied 
by other officers. The suspect was hiding under a porch and the officer ordered 
him to crawl out. At this point, we believe that the officer was justified in hand-
cuffing [the suspect] in the interest of his own safety and the safety of anyone else 
who might have been in the area. 
Id. The court upheld the use of handcuffs, even though it did not know the officer's ability 
to see the suspect, nor what crime the person had allegedly committed. Other courts have 
similarly upheld the use of handcuffs during Terry stops as sound preventive measures. See 
Sanders, 994 F.2d at 205 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 708 (9th Cir. 1983)) 
(Handcuffing in some circumstances is permissible even though "it substantially aggravates 
the .intrusiveness and is not typically part of a Terry stop."); United States v. Miller, 974 
F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (Handcuffing is permissible because the "suspects in the vicin-
ity outnumbered the officers by six to three" and because the officers had reason to believe 
that the suspects were involved in drug trafficking.); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 
326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989). 
418. Voida, 963 F.2d at 958. 
419. See, e.g., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228 ("When a suspect is considered dangerous, re-
quiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest way for police officers to approach 
him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he carries any weapons."); United States 
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("Directing the suspect to lie on the ground 
provided the officers with a better view of the suspect and prevented him from obtaining 
weapons which might have been in the car or on his person."); Courson v. McMillian, 939 
F.2d 1479, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991) (officer reasonably ordered passenger in car to lie on the 
ground because her companions were difficult to handle). The Fifth Circuit in Sanders 
found reasonable an officer's decision to force a suspect to lie on the ground while pointing 
a gun at him: 
Admittedly, being held at gunpoint by the police would be a powerful incentive 
for most persons neither to flee nor resist an impending investigation. Such a 
situation is not, however, equally inspirational for everyone. For example, some 
individuals will be sufficiently familiar with police procedures to believe that the 
officer will not actually use deadly force against them-particularly in close prox-
imity to innocent bystanders-or will be so hesitant to use force that the suspect 
can "get the jump" on the officer. Others, such as persons who have been con-
suming drugs or alcoholic beverages, might misjudge the gravity of the situation 
or might be confused as to which responses on their part are or are not appropri-
ate. A third group will be so desperate to avoid apprehension that they will 
knowingly take any risk to evade the police. 
Sanders, 994 F.2d at 207. Although the court refused to create a rule automatically justify-
ing such use of force, it may offer similar conjectures in other cases. ld. at 206. 
420. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 15 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1994) (having suspect 
sit in cruiser was a "reasonable precautionary measure" as the officer did a computer 
check). 
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allowing officers to always use these means,421 they often perceive suf-
ficient danger to justify these actions. For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit422 stated that even if the force used was too intrusive for a Terry 
stop, the force may nevertheless be reasonable depending on the "de-
gree of suspicion" and the "duration of restraint."423 The court im-
plied that a continuum of force exists for Terry stops as well as arrests: 
if officers lack probable cause for an arrest, but use more force than 
permitted for a Terry stop, the force used may nevertheless be reason-
able, depending upon the officer's suspicion and the degree of 
intrusion. 424 
Most courts uphold the use of intrusive means to execute a Terry 
stop. Although the means officers use during these stops can be psy-
chologically jarring, the implicit message of many courts is that these 
means are designed to prevent further harm to the officer, suspect, 
and perhaps the community. They very easily perceive danger when 
officers act preventively. 
In addition to analyzing danger associated with Terry stops and 
arrests, courts also consider danger the key issue in determining 
whether officers may enter a home without a warrant to aid someone 
during emergencies. How courts assess danger in this context is im-
portant because the home, unlike other places, signifies a profound 
expectation of privacy, an expectation worthy of consideration in bal-
ancing interests under the Fourth Amendment. 
C. Rescue Actions: Emergencies as Inherent Danger 
Occasionally, police officers claim the use of aggressive action 
was necessary to protect the community from harm. In these in-
stances, officers perform "community caretaking" functions, as first 
discussed by the Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski.425 In Cady, 
the Court held that officers who are not suspicious of any criminal 
activity may still act to protect the public if their actions are reason-
able within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.426 Courts disa-
gree regarding the degree of danger that must be present to justify 
421. See, e.g., Sanders, 994 F.2d at 206. 
422. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1226 (court adopted a "sliding scale" to evaluate how intrusive 
police means may be under certain circumstances). 
423. !d. (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 872 (1991)). 
424. !d. 
425. 413 u.s. 433 (1973). 
426. Id. at 446-47. 
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these suspicionless seizures, and do not uniformly weigh the interests 
of the seized individual, society, and the need for caretaking. 
The court's assessment of danger was key to the resolution of the 
motion to suppress evidence at O.J. Simpson's preliminary hearing.427 
The court's ruling centered on whether the detectives who entered 
Mr. Simpson's home reasonably believed that an emergency ex-
isted.428 To support its conclusion that an emergency existed, the 
court detailed its findings of fact, stating that the definition of an 
"emergency'' is "a gray area of the law."429 
In the Simpson case, detectives went to Mr. Simpson's house af-
ter observing the bloody crime scene of the murder of Nicole Brown 
Simpson and Ronald Goldman.430 The court concluded that the 
detectives initially went to the house for two reasons: to inform Mr. 
Simpson of the deaths and to have him assume responsibility for his 
two children, who had been taken to the police station.431 After ring-
ing the doorbell for fifteen minutes and noticing that lights were on 
inside the house and vehicles were parked in the driveway, they called 
Mr. Simpson's home security company.432 When the security com-
pany arrived and provided the detectives with Mr. Simpson's number, 
a detective called and got the answering machine.433 Then a detective 
noticed blood on a vehicle rented by Mr. Simpson.434 Based on these 
facts, the court determined that it was reasonable to believe that an 
emergency existed, which justified a detective climbing a wall that sur-
rounded three residences.435 
The court also held that the emergency authorized a detective to 
enter Simpson's guest quarters and speak with a man who stated that 
he had heard a loud noise earlier that had worried him.436 The detec-
tive then examined tennis shoes found in the guest room.437 The court 
found this action was reasonable because an emergency still existed.438 
According to the court, the detective could examine the shoes because 
427. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, People v. Simpson, BA097211, July 7, 1994 
(available on Prodigy). 
428. Id. at *1. 
429. Id. 
430. Id. at *2. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. at *3. 
433. Id. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. at *6. 
436. Id. 
437. Id. at *4. 
438. Id. 
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he had previously seen bloody footprints at the crime scene.439 Yet in 
justifying the officer's other actions, the court linked each action to 
the detectives' goal of locating people in the houses who could have 
been harmed by the killer.440 Thus, the Court believed that the of-
ficers actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the of-
ficers reasonably believed that other people could have been in 
danger.441 
Other courts have also allowed police officers to enter homes to 
provide aid to a person,442 to search for unknown victims,443 and to 
seize weapons that are a potential danger to residents.444 Other 
courts, however, more closely scrutinized the entering of a home.445 
Courts have also recognized that police officers may perform 
community caretaking functions in other contexts.446 One court has 
439. Id. 
440. Id. at *5-6. 
441. !d. at *6. 
442. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 211 (D.C. App. 1963) (need to give 
aid to unconscious person); State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253,263 (Neb. 1990) (officer reason-
ably believed that entering house was necessary "for the protection of the three small un-
accounted-for children"); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984) (A 
"distraught mother ... believed [her] child to be in peril within the apartment."). When 
officers reasonably believe that an emergency exists, some courts also uphold warrantless 
entries on the ground that if they had not acted they would "have been derelict in their 
duty in light of all the knowledge they possessed." Plant, 461 N.W.2d at 263. 
In Wayne, the District of Columbia Appellate Court stated that courts should defer to 
the judgment of police officers in assessing the danger: 
People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm delibera-
tion associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are 
saved by swift police response. A myriad of circumstances ... [exist:] smoke 
coming out of a window or under a door, the sound of gunfire in a house, threats 
from the inside to shoot through the door at police, reasonable grounds to believe 
that an injured or seriously ill person is being held within. 
Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. In these situations, the court determined that deference is reason-
able. !d. at 214. 
443. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Mich. 1993) (Emergency entries 
"need not be subject to traditional probable cause analysis, but ... their legality should be 
evaluated on the basis of whether the police 'reasonably believed' a person needed aid."). 
444. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 764 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1985) (after son killed 
his father on the porch, officer could reasonably enter house to retrieve the gun put in the 
house by a bystander); State v. Illig, 467 N.W.2d 375,382 (Neb. 1991) (person in house shot 
person on porch; officer reasonably entered the house and seized gun in the house to "pro-
tect the lives" of those near and "to determine if there were any other victims"). 
445. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920-21 (Mich. 1993) (officers who en-
tered a motel room after a reported shooting should have asked desk clerk in which room 
the shooting had occurred; level of intrusiveness is a factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of emergency assistance). 
446. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 505 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Mich. 1993) (The fol-
lowing are emergencies: "remov[ing] a former girlfriend following a domestic dispute, re-
moving an intoxicated person from the street, entering an abandoned boat to ascertain 
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interpreted the Fourth Amendment to severely limit an officer's abil-
ity to perform "welfare stops."447 The Utah Court of Appeals in 
Provo City v. Warden448 stated that in some circumstances officers 
may perform suspicionless seizures to assist citizens. In balancing the 
Fourth Amendment interests, the court stated that such seizures are 
permissible only when "the circumstances demonstrate an imminent 
danger to life or limb."449 The court found that the facts of the case 
signified danger because the officer acted on information from two 
individuals that a driver planned to commit suicide. The Court's deci-
sion paid great deterrence to a citizen's right to privacy and personal 
security.450 This deference, the court reasoned, was necessary to pro-
hibit "pretextual police activities."451 Other courts, though not specif-
ically limiting stops related to imminent danger, have stated that 
serious safety concerns would justify an officer's suspicionless 
intrusion.452 
Other courts, however, appear to trust that police officers per-
form such acts out of concern for citizens rather than as a subterfuge 
seizure or search.453 These courts have not interpreted reasonable-
ness to require danger to a person's life or bodily integrity. These 
courts consider all of the circumstances to determine whether the aid 
ownership and the safety of the mariners, [and] searching an unconscious person for iden-
tification.") (footnotes omitted). 
447. See, e.g., Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992), affd, No. 
930059, 1994 WL 257117 (Utah June 10, 1994). 
448. Id. 
449. ld. at 364. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. 
452. See, e.g., United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560-63 (lOth Cir. 1993) (police 
officer, who was about to ask driver at jammed intersection to quit honking, could ask him 
to leave his car upon seeing a loaded weapon in the car; officer erred in drawing her 
weapon, in a state where citizens may carry guns, and threatening to kill him if he failed to 
follow her order); United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Conn. 1979), affd, 
610 F2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979). The district court stated that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment was "to minimize governmental confrontations with the individual." 470 F. 
Supp. at 708. It nevertheless held that suspicionless stops were permissible when the of-
ficers would be providing significant aid to an individual: 
The most rigorous view of the Fourth Amendment would not bar police officers 
from stopping a motorist to inform him that a bridge beyond a bend in the road 
had just been washed away. Some might contend that, as soon as time permitted, 
even this situation could be handled less intrusively by placing barricades to close 
the road, but a stopping of cars to warn and suggest alternate routes scarcely 
seems unreasonable. 
Id. at 707. The court thus recognized that in emergencies police officers may seize individ-
uals without reasonable suspicion. 
453. See infra text accompanying notes 454-459. 
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was reasonable. For example, some courts have found the following 
stops of drivers to reasonable caretaking actions: stopping those who 
have mist on their rear windows,454 those who are driving on the 
shoulder of a road late at night with a :flashing tum signal,455 and those 
who slow down in a tum lane and roll down their window when near 
an officer.456 In addition, one court remanded so the trial court could 
determine whether an officer acted reasonably in stopping a driver to 
prevent a hat from blowing out of the driver's truck.457 In resolving 
the issue of reasonableness, one court458 stated that it must consider 
whether alternatives were available to the officer to provide the aid.459 
Even courts that use a general reasonableness standard occasion-
ally strike down alleged "caretaking" actions. Some courts find it is 
unreasonable to stop a driver to discuss possible past parking viola-
tions,460 to finish a previously consensual conversation,461 or to give 
directions to someone who appears lost.462 These courts find the ac-
tion by the police officers unreasonable because of the slight weight 
they give to the interest in helping individuals under these circum-
stances and the great weight accorded to a citizen's interest in per-
sonal security and privacy. 
Determining what constitutes an emergency thus requires consid-
eration of the presence of danger. Some courts require significant dan-
ger while other courts look at the circumstances to determine whether 
the aid was reasonable. In deriving these different standards, the 
courts implicitly disagree regarding whether the Fourth Amendment 
presumptively trusts the officers' decisions to search and seize 
individuals. 
D. Protective Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests: Brightline Fictions 
Officers can justify a search incident to a suspect's arrest in three 
situations: to protect the officer as he takes a suspect into custody, to 
454. Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687, 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
455. State v. Goetaski, 507 A.2d 751, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
456. Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9, 10 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
457. State v. Chisholm, 696 P.2d 41, 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
458. State v. Anderson, 439 N.W.2d 840, 848 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other 
grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990). 
459. ld. (Court is to consider "the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alterna-
tives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished."). 
460. ld. at 847. 
461. McDougal v. State, 580 So.2d 324, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
462. United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Conn. 1979), affd 610 F.2d 807 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
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limit escapes, and to prevent the destruction of evidence.463 When 
courts uphold these searches, they rarely specify how the searches fur-
thered these justifications. The only issues generally mentioned under 
this doctrine are whether the areas searched were within the suspect's 
control and whether the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 
Two of these doctrinal elements, however, have become meaningless 
for many courts. Instead of analyzing the facts of a particular case, 
courts have upheld searches even though the facts do not support the 
justification for the search. 
The most blatant disregard of the facts has centered on the sus-
pect's immediate control of evidence of weapons. Courts have cre-
ated a fiction that suspects have access when they do not. Courts have 
upheld the following searches: searches of a suspect's vehicle, even 
though at the time of the search the suspect was detained in a police 
cruiser;464 searches of the suspect's car, even though the suspect was 
shot, handcuffed, and surrounded by police officers;465 searches be-
hind a dresser, even though it was unlikely that the suspect could have 
reached behind the dresser;466 searches of a closet, even though the 
suspect was handcuffed and surrounded by police officers;467 searches 
of handbags and suitcases held by the suspect at time of his arrest, 
even though the officer seized them upon arrest.468 These bizarre 
interpretations of the search incident to an arrest doctrine indicate 
absolute deference to the officer's decision to search an area. Only a 
few courts have placed realistic boundaries on this discretion.469 
463. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text. 
464. See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634-35 (lOth Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); Davis 
v. Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986). 
465. See, e.g., State v. Calovine, 579 A.2d 126, 128 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990). 
466. United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
u.s. 934 (1984). 
467. United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 353-55 (7th Cir. 1988). 
468. United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Morales, 923 F.2d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 1991). 
469. See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634-35 (lOth Cir. 1992) (invalid 
search because "[o]nce [the suspect] had been taken from the scene, there was obviously 
no threat that he might reach in his vehicle and grab a weapon or destroy evidence"); 
United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S 829 (1989) 
(police officers who approach individuals outside their vehicle may not search the car); 
United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (lOth Cir. 1985) (search may be broader when 
officers search vehicles as opposed to other areas because of the diminished expectation of 
privacy); United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321,330 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (once police have 
control of an object and "there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access 
to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no 
longer incident to the arrest."). 
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Several courts explicitly state that officers need not closely ex-
amine the facts of a particular case to determine whether the suspect 
had actual access to the searched area.470 A search may be reasonable 
even if access was "slight."471 Although one court stated that an of-
ficer should not consider a suspect to be either "'an acrobat"' or 
"'Houdini,"'472 searches are routinely upheld that require such rare 
physical skills. Similarly, some courts fail to give meaning to the doc-
trinal requirement that searches must be contemporaneous with 
arrests.473 
Prior to the embedding of these fictions in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, some circuits examined the totality of the cir-
cumqtances to assess actual access.474 The standard for this assess-
ment was similar to the standard for analyzing the means officers use 
during Terry stops. For example, the Ninth Circuit475 considered the 
number of suspects and officers, the suspects' location, and the use of 
guns. This totality of circumstances standard, however, later gave way 
to the fiction, which did not require actual access. 
470. See, e.g., United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506-07 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). In Arango, the Seventh Circuit described this common 
deference: 
[The Jaw] does not require the arresting officer to undergo a detailed analysis, at 
the time of arrest, of whether the arrestee, handcuffed or not, could reach into the 
car to seize some item within, either as a weapon or to destroy evidence, or for 
some altogether different reason. The facts surrounding each arrest are unique, 
and it is not by any means inconceivable under those various possibilities that an 
arrestee could gain control of some item within the automobile. The Jaw simply 
does not require the arresting officer to mentally sift through all these possibilities 
during an arrest, before deciding whether he may lawfully search within the 
vehicle. 
Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (lOth Cir. 1985). See also United 
States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1988) (courts should not second-guess police 
officers because they "cannot be expected to make punctilious judgments regarding what is 
within and what is just beyond the arrestee's 'immediate control"'). 
471. Queen, 847 F.2d at 353 (quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983)). 
472. United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting United States 
v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
473. See, e.g., Karlin, 852 F.2d at 971 (issue is whether suspect had access to area at time 
of arrest, not at time of search); Palumbo, 735 F.2d at 1097 (upheld search even though it 
was unlikely that suspect had access to area at time of arrest). 
474. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 u.s. 824 (1984). 
475. Id. Later the Ninth Circuit replaced the actual access standard with a fiction. See 
United States v. Thrner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 103 (1991). 
In Turner, the Ninth Circuit held that officers may search an area if the suspect had access 
to it at the time he was arrested, even if later he was removed in handcuffs. Id. 
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In determining the constitutionality of searches incident to ar-
rests, some courts have not applied a totality of circumstances stan-
dard. The fiction adopted by some courts is not linked to any of the 
justifications supporting the search. Rather, many courts allow these 
searches based merely on the belief that police officers should have 
broad discretion in deciding whether to search the ~ea. 
Although a reasonableness standard does not provide police of-
ficers with bright lines to guide their actions, analyzing circumstances 
based upon doctrinal justifications seems to be at least a floor for judi-
cial scrutiny. In assessing the circumstances surrounding preventive 
actions by police officers, such as Terry frisks and emergencies, courts 
have often fused the issue of reasonableness with the issue of danger. 
Often, in the context of searches incident to arrest, the danger analysis 
has not only disappeared from the analysis but is nonexistent. The 
common thread to these doctrines is the Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness standard. 
VII. Dangerous Misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment: 
The Substitution of Judicial Perspective for 
Executive Judgments 
When police officers strike suspects or act preventively by per-
forming frisks, searches incident to arrests, or community caretaking 
functions, the constitutionality of their actions depends upon whether 
their actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although in each of these areas the Supreme Court has articulated 
doctrinal elements for this reasonableness inquiry, in evaluating the 
police conduct, many courts focus almost exclusively on the danger 
presented by the situation. This focus has at times resulted in courts 
finding the assessment of danger to be synonymous with the reasona-
bleness inquiry. Although the reasonableness inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment is not formulaic, it does include more than an as-
sessment of danger. In addition to society's interest in law enforce-
ment, the reasonableness inquiry encompasses both society's and the 
individual's interest in personal security. By centering the inquiry on 
the danger presented by circumstances, some courts err by interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment to require almost absolute deference to an 
officer's perception of danger. In doing so, they have often failed to 
scrutinize other important aspects of the confrontation: the gravity of 
the offense committed by a suspect, the availability of other means to 
apprehend the suspect, the role officers played in creating the need for 
force, the jury's role in determining what actually happened, and the 
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intrusive nature of many preventive actions. This misapplied defer-
ence is pronounced when the circumstances involve a psychologically 
disturbed individual, a frisk, a community caretaking function, or a 
search incident to an arrest. An examination of each of these mis-
perceptions reveals how courts should interpret the reasonableness 
inquiry. 
A. Danger is Only a Factor in Determining Reasonableness 
The right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" is 
a right that courts should interpret in light of the history and purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment. These two inquiries shape the reasonable-
ness standard and reveal that the assessment of danger is not synony-
mous with the determination of reasonableness. The constitutionality 
of a police practice requires consideration of numerous issues, with 
the assessment of danger as only a single factor. Although scholars 
disagree as to the role the warrant clause plays in the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, they nevertheless recognize that reasonableness com-
pels consideration of numerous interests.476 Describing and weighing 
these interests are key issues in litigation arising from officers' preven-
tive actions and their use of physical force against a suspect. 
The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect individuals from 
oppressive governmental actions. Because governmental practices 
during the colonial era were intrusive and arbitrary, the framers of the 
Fourth Amendment erected a shield to protect citizens from unrea-
sonable government actions. After examining this history, Professor 
Tracey Maclin soundly concluded that the Reasonableness Clause rep-
resents a mistrust of police power. Evaluating how police officers use 
this police power, however, is not limited to examining only those 
practices present at common law, because the Framers could not have 
intended to freeze from scrutiny newer methods arising from techno-
logical developments. As Professor Carol Steiker has noted, "use of 
the term 'reasonable' ... positively invites constructions that change 
with changing circumstances."477 The history and purpose of the 
Amendment thus indicate a need to evaluate police practices to en-
sure they do not unreasonably infringe upon the "right of the people 
to be secure. "478 
476. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 
757, 759-61 (1994); CarolS. Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 HARv. L. 
REv. 820, 824 (1994). 
477. Steiker, supra note 476, at 824. 
478. U.S. CoNST. Amend. IV. 
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Thus, determining the scope of an individual's right to be secure 
is the same question as determining what is an unreasonable search or 
seizure. Reasonableness emerges as the standard for measuring po-
lice practices. This inquiry, however, requires a balancing of interests, 
not a quick glance to determine if the practices are rational. Although 
reasonableness as a standard cannot be precisely described, the his-
tory and purpose of the Amendment should nevertheless guide how 
courts identify and weigh the interests. 
Balancing interests under the Fourth Amendment, as with bal-
ancing interests under other amendments, is a process linked to per-
ceived values represented in the Amendment. In the context of 
aggressive actions against suspects, the United States Supreme Court 
in Tennessee v. Gamer479 and Graham v. Connor480 emphasized the 
importance of personal security both to the individual seized and to 
society. In Gamer, the Court valued highly an individual's right to life 
and society's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt.481 It held that in 
some situations these interests outweigh society's interest in effective 
law enforcement.482 It thus held that officers may act unreasonably 
when they shoot fleeing felons. Similarly, in Graham, the Court de-
tailed three factors that help to measure the degree of intrusiveness of 
police practices: the crime committed, the immediacy of harm to of-
ficers or the community, and the suspect's resistance.483 In listing 
these factors, the Court offered guidelines to evaluate police practices. 
The Court in Terry v. Ohio also described the importance of the 
right to personal security as it upheld an officer's limited ability to 
frisk suspects.484 It stated, "[A frisk] is a serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly."485 It held 
that this preventive action, one not designed to inflict bodily injury, 
must be carefully limited to the need to protect officers from armed 
and dangerous suspects.486 Only under these circumstances would the 
Fourth Amendment permit officers to pat down a suspect because the 
right to personal security "belongs as much to the citizen on the 
479. 471 U.S. at 11-12. 
480. 490 U.S. at 395 ("'[R]easonableness' of a particular seizure depends not only on 
when it is made, but also on how it is carried out."). 
481. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. 
482. Id. at 19. 
483. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
484. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. 
485. ld. at 17. 
486. Id. at 26. 
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streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dis-
pose of his secret affairs."487 This right thus broadly protects both 
bodily integrity and privacy. 
However, when interpreting these decisions, some lower courts, 
have misunderstood the reasonableness inquiry. They have inter-
preted the Court's discussion of. danger in Garner, Graham, and Terry 
as the standard for measuring reasonableness. In doing so, they have 
shifted the balance to the goal of promoting law enforcement. Woe-
fully absent from this perspective is a recognition of the history of the 
Fourth Amendment. If mistrust of police power was the impetus for 
passage of the Fourth Amendment, then interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment to strongly further law enforcement interests makes no 
sense. Thus, balancing requires evaluat~g conflicting interests, not 
just discerning the presence of danger. When courts focus their atten-
tion solely on the issue of danger, they fail to consider other interests 
furthered by the Fourth Amendment. 
B. The Gravity of the Offense is a Factor in Determining 
Reasonableness 
An important factor in the calculation of reasonableness is the 
offense the suspect allegedly committed, which compelled an investi-
gation, an attempt to apprehend, or any protective measure. The 
Supreme Court explicitly mentioned this factor in both Garner and 
Graham as it described how to evaluate the use of force by police 
officers.488 It also stated in Wisconsin v. WelS'h489 that the gravity of 
the offense is an important factor in determining the presence of exi-
gent circumstances. In Terry, the Court also used the nature of the 
suspected offense, armed robbery, as a factor in determining whether 
the investigating officer could have believed that the suspect was 
armed and dangerous. 490 
In assessing the use of force against suspects, many courts have 
failed to consider the nature of the alleged offense. They have instead 
focused on two issues: the threat posed by the suspect and the sus-
pect's resistance. They have interpreted these factors as creating a 
"dangerousness" standard. Such an interpretation, however, is mis-
guided. The second Graham factor questions not only whether there 
was a threat, but also if the threat was present at the time the officer 
487. ld. at 9. 
488. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
489. 466 u.s. 740, 752 (1984). 
490. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. 
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acted. This immediacy requirement limits the use of force by focusing 
on the force actually necessary. Similarly, the third factor simply 
questions whether the suspect resisted. It does not necessarily imply 
that all resistance must be checked by ever increasing uses of force. 
These erroneous interpretations do not adequately consider the 
first factor listed in Graham: the crime the person allegedly committed 
that required police officers to seize him. If an eleven-year-old boy 
stole a pair of sunglasses from a discount store and resisted the of-
ficers' commands to stop, should they tackle him and use pain compli-
ance techniques to control him, if they know the boy, where he lives 
and that their actions may incite nearby youths observing the confron-
tation? Because the Reasonableness Clause requires a balancing of 
interests, such an action is unreasonable in light of the offense com-
mitted and the surrounding circumstances. 
The significance of the crime allegedly committed depends upon 
the circumstances of the confrontation between the officer and sus-
pect. For example, if a childless suspect has just killed his wife, he has 
just committed a crime involving the "serious infliction of bodily in-
jury." A literal reading of this language from Garner might seem to 
suggest that officers could automatically shoot him when they see him. 
Yet, under some circumstances he may not pose an immediate danger 
to anyone else. In short, even though he committed a heinous act, he 
may not be an immediate threat to anyone else. He may have already 
killed the only person that was logically at risk. Although he may 
pose a threat to himself, it would be unreasonable to kill him unless 
the surrounding circumstances change drastically to signify an imme-
diate danger to police officers and the community. By barring officers 
from shooting, both the suspect's right to personal security and soci-
ety's interest in a fair adjudication of his guilt are preserved. 
The focus on danger analysis perhaps has risen from reliance on 
the continuum-of-force model for apprehending suspects. Many of-
ficers are trained to escalate the degree of force if a suspect resists 
their commands. The continuum itself does not signify that there ever 
is any need to let the suspect go. Only at the end of the continuum, 
which authorizes the use of deadly force, is there a check, one estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. In the nondeadly 
force context, officers may be constitutionally required to let suspects 
go rather than use escalating force. 
The balance of interests, represented by the reasonableness stan-
dard, at times should limit the use of nondeadly force in apprehending 
suspects, even when they flee. An interest that sometimes tilts the 
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balance toward allowing flight is the individual's right to bodily integ-
rity. Although the dissent in Garner argued that all suspects can 
maintain this interest by stopping,491 the majority properly interpreted 
the balancing process to protect a suspect's fundamental interest in his 
life.492 The suspect in Garner was not required to stop for the Consti-
tution to protect this interest. Although one's interest in life is signifi-
cantly stronger than one's interest in bodily integrity, the balancing 
process should question whether at times this interest, as in Garner, 
outweighs the interest in law enforcement. By considering the nature 
of the alleged offense, courts and officers can better distinguish the 
scope of reasonable conducr. Determining when police officers 
should cease using nonlethal force and let a suspect flee is also linked 
to the availability of alternative means to seize suspects. This issue, 
like the alleged offense, is also frequently ignored by courts. 
C. Judicial Scrutiny Does Not Constitute Impermissible Second-
Guessing of Police Officers' Split-Second Judgments 
Courts often fail to consider the availability of alternative means 
of action because of an implicit belief that such scrutiny constitutes 
impermissible second-guessing of officers' split-second judgments. 
Such broad-ranging deference, however, is inappropriate and contrary 
to our well-established doctrine of judicial review. Analyzing the 
availability of alternative means should be an important factor in de-
termining reasonableness. 
It is difficult to understand the role of available alternatives be-
cause the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue. 
When considering some preventive actions, the Court has not care-
fully evaluated available alternatives. However, in the seminal deci-
sions of Garner and Terry, the Court limited the means officers could 
employ when investigating and apprehending suspects.493 Scrutiny of 
means, however, does not necessarily require identifying the least in-
trusive practice. It entails consideration of whether the police practice 
was reasonable in light of available alternatives. 
One of the Court's most deferential opinions addressing preven-
tive actions is Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,494 in which the 
Court held that police officers may stop drivers at roadblocks for the 
purpose of determining whether they are intoxicated. The Court up-
491. Garner, 471 U.S. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
492. !d. at 9. 
493. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12; Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. 
494. 496 u.s 444, 447-55 (1990). 
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held the practice as a safety measure, which allows officers to seize 
individuals even though they have no reason to believe they are intox-
icated.495 In balancing the interests of the parties, the Court deter-
mined that this practice compelled a driver to stop for only a few 
seconds, that the police officers' actions were not arbitrary, that drunk 
driving was a serious problem, and that roadblocks were an "effec-
tive" means of stopping drunk drivers.496 Although the Court explic-
itly evaluated the means used by the officers, it was reluctant to 
subject the means to heightened review. It stated, "[F]or the purposes 
of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable al-
ternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique 
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, in-
cluding a finite number of police officers."497 It nevertheless deter-
mined that the practice was reasonable. It merely refused to decide 
which plan for stopping drunk driving was "ideal."498 
The Court in other preventive decisions has expressed a reluc-
tance for close scrutiny of means. In Cady v. Dombrowski499 and 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms,500 the Court held that a police officer's deci-
sion to search a towed car for a gun and to order a suspect out of a car 
during a traffic stop was reasonable. In Cady, the Court examined 
community safety;501 however, in Mimms, the issue was the officer's 
safety.502 In both decisions, the Court did not determine the least in-
trusive means available.503 
When the practice involves, however, serious infringements of 
bodily integrity and privacy, the Court is more willing to closely evalu-
ate the means. For example, Garner limited the use of deadly force,504 
Graham limited the use of nondeadly force,505 Terry limited the na-
ture of a frisk,506 and Winston v. Lee5°1 limited the government's abil-
495. ld. at 435. 
496. Id. 
497. Id. at 453-54. 
498. ld. at 453. 
499. 413 u.s. 433, 446 (1973). 
500. 434 u.s. 106, 110-11 (1977). 
501. Cady, 413 U.S. at 447. 
502. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. 
503. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Set-
ting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 
1176 (1988) ("The Court's fourth amendment balancing analyses have neither systemati-
cally evaluated the marginal law enforcement benefits of challenged searches and seizures, 
nor regularly incorporated the 'least intrusive alternative' requirement."). 
504. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
505. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. 
506. Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-27. 
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ity to obtain evidence by performing surgery on a suspect. The 
heightened scrutiny of means in these situations is proper because po-
lice practices significantly intrudes upon bodily security and privacy. 
When the balance is so heavily weighted against the police prac-
tice, the lack of alternatives is an important issue. In this situation, the 
lack of another alternative is relevant, but not dispositive, of the rea-
sonableness question. For example, in Gamer, the Court barred kill-
ing the fleeing burglary suspect, even though it assumed that the 
officers would not apprehend him later.508 Similarly, in Winston, the 
Court barred surgery to remove a bullet from the suspect, even 
though it was the only way to retrieve this evidence.509 The availabil-
ity of alternatives thus becomes one issue in the reasonableness in-
quiry, and its significance depends upon the circumstances of each 
case. 
D. Conduct Prior to a Seizure May Be Relevant in Determining 
Reasonableness 
Examining alternatives requires consideration of when to begin 
scrutinizing the means used by officials. This question arises when of-
ficers believe that greater force is necessary because of the suspect's 
prior conduct. Some courts limit their scrutiny of means to the point 
the officers seized a suspect. Such bright-line temporal limitations, 
however, seriously undermine the right to personal security by failing 
to consider prior conduct. The confusion as to when to evaluate the 
means used by the officers results from the Supreme Court's language 
regarding the nature of policing and its incredibly narrowing "seizure" 
definitions. 
The disagreement as to temporal limitations stems from the 
Supreme Court's discussion of policing in Graham. The Graham 
Court stated that when courts and juries determine reasonableness, 
they should remember that "police officers are often forced to make 
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 
and rapidly evolving. "510 In examining this language, some courts 
confuse the nature of policing with deference to police officers' deci-
sions. Although the Court stated that the dangerous nature of polic-
ing is a factor in determining reasonableness, it did not state that 
strong deference is necessary because policing is difficult. Such an in-
507. 470 u.s. 753, 766 (1985). 
508. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11. 
509. Winston, 470 U.S. at 766. 
510. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
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terpretation fails to take into consideration how police officers are 
trained. When police officers practice shooting their weapons, they 
often do so in conditions designed to simulate situations requiring 
quick judgment. An ability to make quick decisions simply describes 
a skill required of police officers. It does not prohibit examining 
whether their actions prior to the seizure created the need for force. 
Determining how far back in time courts and juries should look 
when determining whether officers created the need for force is the 
most difficult issue associated with temporal limitations. Although the 
moment an officer seizes a suspect seems like a logical starting point, 
conduct prior to seizure at times may be significantly linked to the 
seizure. Like the classic question of proximate cause, this question is 
a policy question implicit in the standard of reasonableness. 
The temporal question probably would not exist except for the 
Court's ever narrowing seizure definitions. Prior to the Court's 
seizure definition in California v. Hodari D.,511 courts more readily 
determined that officers had seized suspects by their actions. The 
Hodari D. Court drastically limited the circumstances constituting 
seizure as it held that a "show of authority" by police officers does not 
automatically constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.512 By adding to its definition of seizure that the suspect 
must comply with the assertion of authority, the Court moved the 
point of seizure further ahead in time. 
By considering actions prior to a seizure, courts do not expand 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment because only those actions caus-
ally linked with the seizure are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. 
Thus, if the suspect never complied with the show of authority, then 
no seizure occurred and the prior conduct is not governed by the 
Fourth Amendment. If, however, the officers shot the suspect be-
cause he failed to comply with the show of authority, the officers' 
prior actions may be causally linked to the seizure. Considering ac-
tions prior to the seizure may in some circumstances further the con-
stitutional right to personal security, because reasonableness is the 
applicable standard and the Federal Rules broadly define relevance. 
E. Reasonableness is a Constitutional Standard, Not One Governed 
by State Law or National Police Practices 
Although the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures, it does not specify how courts should determine 
511. 499 u.s. 621 (1991). 
512. Id. at 625-26. 
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reasonableness. Such an open-ended standard invites consideration of 
a variety of sources to ascertain its meaning. When courts and juries 
determine whether officers violated the Fourth Amendment, they nec-
essarily distinguish a constitutional violation from a state law viola-
tion, such as battery or trespass. This distinction is important when 
considering the role of experts in determining the reasonableness of a 
police practice. Although their testimony may be relevant to resolve 
reasonableness, their opinion does not resolve the Fourth Amend-
ment question. 
If policing experts resolved the issue of reasonableness, the judi-
ciary would be stripped of its power to interpret the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court, in Gamer, recognized its role when it rejected the 
well-established police practice of killing fleeing felons.513 Although 
this practice was established at common law and a majority of police 
departments still adhered to the common law rule, the Court never-
theless interpreted the balancing process implicit in the Reasonable-
ness Clause as prohibiting the practice.514 Similarly, in Graham, the 
Court affirmed that arbitrary use of physical force does not necessarily 
violate the Fourth Amendment.515 Arbitrary force must rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation to be actionable. 
Distinguishing constitutional torts from state torts, however, has 
been difficult for courts. Some courts have erroneously interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment as creating a negligence standard. Such an 
interpretation, however, strips from the Amendment its rich history 
that instructs courts and juries to protect the interests of citizens and 
society. Even though the Fourth Amendment and negligence claims 
both consider the availability of alternatives, they are different. 
Although no treatise could clearly delineate how to make this distinc-
tion, courts and juries properly interpret the Fourth Amendment 
when they consider the interests it protects. Simple reliance on the 
common law or national police standards undervalues the right to per-
sonal security. 
F. In Civil Cases Juries Must Often Determine What Constitutes 
Objective Reasonableness 
Who determines what constitutes objectively reasonable conduct 
is an important issue when the Fourth Amendment issue arises in a 
513. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
514. ld. 
515. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. 
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civil action under section 1983.516 Although courts in criminal cases 
find facts during suppression hearings on Fourth Amendment issues, 
when civil cases raise Fourth Amendment issues, courts sometimes 
misunderstand the objective reasonableness standard.517 Some courts 
deprive the jury of its role of determining the facts of the case and 
applying the standard of reasonableness. 
Although the jury system is still not free from the significant 
problem of racial bias, it nevertheless plays an important role in evalu-
ating police practices. Many courts, however, have erroneously inter-
preted the decisions in Garner and Graham as urging courts to resolve 
the issue of reasonableness.518 This error arises from perceiving the 
decisions as requiring broad deference to police officers' decisions. 
One of the most important functions of the jury is to determine credi-
bility. This is particularly important when officers kill a suspect with-
out witnesses present and later justify their actions by asserting that 
the suspect made a furtive gesture. Determining whether a suspect's 
action was "furtive" is an extremely important jury issue because 
when courts automatically defer to the officers' written assertions they 
may unknowingly give the officers a license to murder at will. In this 
situation, assessing credibility is essential. One scholar has further ad-
vocated the use of a jury in criminal cases to resolve Fourth Amend-
ment suppression motions.519 This practice would allow juries to 
reject some legal fictions easily accepted by some courts, such as the 
broad searches permitted by the courts' interpretation of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine. Few jurors would believe that suspects 
possess unusual skills to reach guns and contraband. Yet, even if ju-
ries were to review these claims, such review would not overly deter 
police practices because many jurors believe that criminal defendants 
are only "second-class citizens."520 
Although some cases involving police practices can be resolved 
on summary judgment when material facts are not in dispute, courts 
should not infringe upon the jury's role as fact-finder when credibility 
is a key issue, as it is in many police misconduct cases. 
516. 42 u.s.c. 1983. 
517. See supra text accompanying notes_. 
518. See supra text accompanying notes . 
519. See generaiiy Bacigal, supra note 212. 
520. Maclin, supra note 13, at 238. Juries also often fail to check the misuse of police 
power because of racial prejudices. See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of 
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 
781, 784 (1994) ("Exploitation of racial fears [was] evident in the trial of the four white Los 
Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King."). 
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G. Justifying Preventive Actions Based on Danger vs. Justifying 
Aggressive Actions Based on Danger 
Although fact-finders assess danger when examining both aggres-
sive and preventive actions by police officers, danger justifying pre-
ventive actions is different from danger justifying aggressive actions. 
Although danger in one context should constitute the same perception 
of danger in the other context, the lower courts' interpretations of 
preventive actions signify a presumption that many preventive actions 
based on danger are reasonable. Such a presumption applied to ag-
gressive actions would seriously undermine the right to personal 
security. 
The need for a dual standard of danger is apparent when consid-
ering a fact-finder's assessment that a suspect was armed and danger-
ous, justifying a protective frisk, and the finding that the suspect was 
armed, justifying the use of deadly force. When many courts deter-
mine the constitutionality of a particular frisk, they easily perceive 
that the officers were in danger. For example, many courts seem to 
presume that if an officer is investigating a suspect for drug posses-
sion, the officer may frisk the suspect because he is "armed and dan-
gerous." Similarly, courts have allowed officers to use incredibly 
intrusive measures during Terry stops as preventive measures. 
Although pointing guns at suspects should convert most stops into ar-
rests, many courts have allowed this intensive show of authority as a 
preventive measure. In addition, courts have allowed officers to frisk 
suspects merely because they failed to comply with the officer's com-
mand to freeze. The war on drugs has resulted in police officers hav-
ing greater preventive power to control suspects. 
These same facts, however, applied in the context of aggressive 
actions should not justify the use of significant force. Although many 
courts fail to recognize that frisks constitute "serious intrusion[s],"521 
they should assess differently the need to strike or shoot suspects 
based on similar facts. When officers act aggressively, they signifi-
cantly infringe upon the individual's constitutional right to personal 
security. In this context, because of the heightened interest associated 
with bodily integrity, the availability of alternative methods of appre-
hending becomes more important than in the context of preventive 
actions. A suspicious movement by a suspect more readily supports a 
frisk than a strike by a police officer. 
521. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. 
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Although such a distinction in danger analysis may seem obvious, 
the broad language that some courts use in discussing danger does not 
suggest such a limitation. In determining reasonableness, courts must 
consider all of the circumstances. An important circumstance in de-
termining reasonableness is the magnitude of the infringement caused 
by the officer. The perception of danger is thus not an automatic justi-
fication for an aggressive action by police officers. 
H. The Community Caretaking Function Doctrine Requires 
Reasonable Conduct 
Danger analysis has also been a significant aspect of the commu-
nity caretaking function doctrine. The doctrine by its very nature em-
phasizes that in some situations officers may avoid compliance with 
the usual procedures of the Fourth Amendment in order to aid soci-
ety. Interpreted broadly, however, this doctrine can seriously under-
mine the Fourth Amendment right to personal security. The need for 
a narrow scope of this doctrine is apparent when considering the mag-
istrate's ruling on the motion to suppress evidence at O.J. Simpson's 
preliminary hearing. 
The court held that detectives lawfully entered Mr. Simpson's 
house to render aid to possible victims inside. Under this doctrine, 
officers did not need probable cause to believe that someone was in 
danger. They merely needed a reasonable belief that someone may be 
hurt. What is reasonable in this context, however, should also depend 
upon the degree of infringement on the right to personal security. If 
the justification for entering a home is to save a person known to be 
hurt, the balance tips in favor of entry. On the other hand, when spec-
ulation is the basis of entry, entry may still be permissible if officers do 
not invoke the plain view doctrine to justify seizing items they would 
not have had access to but for the entry. In that situation, the officers 
truly perform an act of public service; they leave at the doorstep any 
desire to investigate criminal conduct. 
Although the community caretaking function and its relationship 
to the exclusionary rule is a topic mandating extensive scrutiny, it is an 
important piece of the courts' assessment of danger under the Fourth 
Amendment. As with other doctrines, the exigencies of the day may 
too often tip the balance to the side of law enforcement. The right to 
personal security and privacy must also weigh heavily in assessing the 
need to act as the community's caretaker. 
704 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623 
I. Reasonableness Requires an Actual Access Standard for Searches 
Incident To Arrests 
Determining what constitutes reasonable police practice is diffi-
cult. Yet when the police practice is a search incident to an arrest, 
many courts have abandoned the reasonableness inquiry for a bright-
line fiction: the area in a suspect's control is the area he had access to 
prior to being arrested. In doing so, courts do not require the suspect 
to have actual access to the areas at the time of the search. This fic-
tion thus cuts the doctrine loose from its underlying justifications of 
protecting officers, preventing escapes, and preserving evidence. The 
development of this fiction underscores the need for a reasonableness 
standard that seriously considers the right to personal security. 
When the Court in Chime! v. Califomia5'22 detailed the scope of 
searches incident to arrests, it scrutinized the means used by the of-
ficers. The Court refused to allow officers to search an entire house 
simply because the homeowner had allegedly committed a crime. In 
analyzing this decision, Professor Nadine Strossen commended the 
Court for its emphasis on narrowly tailored means.523 She interpreted 
the decision as requiring police officers to use the least intrusive police 
practice to further their reasonable concerns about safety and destruc-
tion of evidence. The decision thus signified that the Fourth Amend-
ment required scrutiny of intrusive police practices. 
Through the years many courts have abandoned such scrutiny, 
interpreting the progeny of Chime! as documenting the need for a 
bright-line rule. That bright line became the area not in the defend-
ant's actual control, but the area where he had been prior to the 
search. Although the need for bright-line rules is understandable, the 
rules must have some relationship to the doctrinal justifications. 
By discarding reasonableness as the standard for evaluating such 
searches, some courts failed to give any weight to the right of privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a decline in analysis can 
occur when courts give broad deference to police officers' decisions 
and little weight to the right to personal security. Such deference has 
crept into the consideration of other preventive actions. When defer-
ence becomes routine, courts are more likely to create legal fictions-
fictions not rooted in the facts of the case nor the history of the 
Amendment. Perhaps the development of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine signifies the scope of the reasonableness analysis for 
522. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
523. See Strossen, supra note 503. 
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other Fourth Amendment doctrines if the courts fail to discard their 
misperceptions. Abandoning the legal fiction associated with searches 
incident to arrest is a beginning towards restoring reasonableness to it 
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Vlll. Conclusion 
Dangerous misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment have seri-
ously eroded the constitutional right to personal security, a right that 
protects both suspects and society from unreasonable police practices. 
These misperceptions have occurred because courts have erroneously 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" as raising a single question: Does the chal-
lenged police practice rationally further protecting police officers and 
society from danger? By fusing the reasonableness standard with the 
assessment of danger, many courts fail to understand the history of 
the Fourth Amendment and the balancing of interests mandated by 
the Reasonableness Clause. 
The history of the Fourth Amendment reveals a mistrust of un-
checked police power. The strong deference courts grant the judg-
ments of police officers conflicts with this history of mistrust. By 
failing to recognize this important historical perspective, courts have 
skewed the balance of interests in favor of upholding intrusive police 
practices rather than beginning the balancing process with level scales. 
This pronounced deference has affected the balancing process in 
numerous ways. By focusing solely on the danger a suspect represents 
to police officers and society, courts often fail to discern society's in-
terest in personal security. The devaluation of this right is particularly 
apparent when courts refuse to consider whether officers could have 
used less intrusive means to apprehend suspects. Courts also under-
mine the right to personal security by not considering the nature of 
the offense that first prompted investigation. The type of offense is 
important because officers should recognize that sometimes they are 
constitutionally required to let suspects go rather than use ever in-
creasing amounts of force. This highly deferential standard of review 
has resulted in courts refusing to consider whether the officers' cre-
ated the need for force and deciding fact-bound cases on summary 
judgment. 
In determining reasonableness, courts should consider that dan-
ger is only one factor, which may be outweighed by the suspect's right 
to personal security and privacy. Inherent in this balancing process is 
a recognition that aggressive police actions, such as the use of force 
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during arrests, are markedly different from preventive actions, such as 
Terry frisks, searches incident to arrests, and community caretaking 
functions. Even though preventive actions also intrude upon the right 
to personal security, the perception of possible danger more easily jus-
tifies upholding a preventive action than an aggressive action. The 
goal of a preventive action is to protect suspects, officers and others 
from possible bodily harm; the goal of an aggressive action, however, 
is to protect officers and others from possible harm by directly attack-
ing a suspect's interest in bodily integrity. Courts should thus balance 
differently the need to frisk suspects for weapons and the need to 
strike or shoot them. The broad language many courts use in describ-
ing the danger officers face during investigations masks this important 
difference. The right to personal security deserves protection from 
the courts' dangerous misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment. 
